A couple of years ago, I wrote some essays about the transformation of the land acknowledgement from a ritual act that engaged in small-scale compensation of victims of colonialism into Canada’s answer to American Thanksgiving, a process by which settlers welcome themselves to the land they are stealing and then thank their victim for allowing their land to be stolen, like it was their idea.
Silly me. Land acknowledgements were merely the incubator of a new horror dreamed up by the brain trust of smug, woke colonialism, Truth and Reconciliation Day. The new kind of colonial rhetoric the managerial class has been practicing at corporate retreats, faculty meetings and gatherings of labour aristocrats and non-profit executive directors is now being taken nation-wide as an annual festival of white guilt and narcissistic mock self-flagellation.
To understand why this is happening, why the face of colonialism is now always crying, we need to trace the idea of “truth and reconciliation” as a political project from its inception, to understand what it was and what it now is.
When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, it became clear that the Soviet imperial project had entered its terminal phase. The Soviet economy was being hammered not just by pent-up dissent from within and the rapid loss of its vassal states but by shifting global commodity prices that hammered its balance sheet and economy that, in turn, devalued and destabilized the ruble. The state increasingly lost the capacity to deliver the things its populace wanted and this, in turn, increased emigration and political dissent.
Ironically, a similar thing that had happened to the USSR was happening to the Republic of South Africa, the terrifying, retrograde white supremacist regional power of sub-Saharan Africa. Like the USSR under Mikhael Gorbachev, South Africa, under PW Botha, had attempted to engage in incremental liberalization by expanding opportunities for democratic participation. Botha had partially enfranchised previously disenfranchised South Asians and “coloureds” of mixed race; he had also rapidly expanded the “Bantustan” system, ceding large but economically unproductive swaths of South Africa to black-led governments.
As in Eastern Europe, these concessions had the effect of altering the horizon of expectation of South Africans in exactly the wrong way. Now that the government was beginning to yield and its multi-state solution was failing, the way forward was clear: a one-state solution of all South Africans, irrespective of race. Following a massive increase in resistance, which was met with escalating state violence and torture, Botha was forced to step down and his successor, FW de Klerk was given a clear mandate by the party: fix this.
As in the USSR, increasing international sanctions, increasing isolation, declining commodity prices had produced a crisis of confidence in the middle class who began both emigrating and dissenting at rapidly increasing rates. Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, the legendary cold warriors and the biggest boosters of South Africa were gone and their successors saw no need to prop up an embarrassing and corrupt regime now that the Cold War had been won.
De Klerk’s job was clear: stabilize the rand; increase its purchasing power; fill the stores with imported goods again. In other words, maintain the wealth of the propertied class and the economic privileges and heritage of white caste by any means necessary.
This meant striking an agreement with the African National Congress. The ANC had a number of leaders, a ceremonial imprisoned leader, Nelson Mandela, an international celebrity whose personality cult had been carefully constructed by Oliver Tambo, the acting president, who ran the organization from Zambia, the nearest state to South Africa that would dare to host its government-in-exile. Its most senior and powerful leader inside the country was Joe Slovo, the head of the South African Communist Party.
Tambo and Mandela were, like Slovo, Soviet-aligned communists. That meant that at the very moment they should have had the strongest hand in the negotiations De Klerk commenced, the reality was that their primary patron had just disintegrated into a post-Soviety free-for-all of plunder, corruption and political incoherence.
We must then understand that the negotiations over the peaceful transfer of power in South Africa were skewed first, in the sense that one side held all state power and the other held none, second, in the sense that one side’s international allies had just won the Cold War and the other’s had vanished and, third, in the sense that the context of the negotiation was a hegemonic global neoliberal consensus to which all major parties in all major states were abjectly capitulating.
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With little hand to play, the ANC negotiators got the best they could: new courts with limited subpoena powers and no ability to attach jeopardy to the hearings they conducted. They could make the war criminals testify but only without jeopardy attached. Almost the entire white population was blanket-immunized against prosecution for the atrocities they had committed.
The practical purpose of these courts was twofold: rapid on-the-job education of newly-minted black lawyers in courtroom procedure and an opportunity for the victims of the regime to experience some limited sense of “closure” by hearing their tormentors at least confess to their despicable acts.
The political purpose of the court was vast: to create a mandate for the new South African state to use its police forces and judiciary to protect white South Africans’ ill-gotten gains, their wealth, their consumer spending power, their ability to continue employing black servants in their homes and black miners in their gold and diamond mines. And so it needed a really catchy name. They called it the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
Nearly thirty years since the transfer of power, history’s verdict is mixed. An evil that the TRC had been created to prevent did not happen; South Africa never descended into civil war. But the massive asymmetry between the voting power of black South Africans and that of whites versus the countervailing imbalance of economic power, and a state hamstrung by neoliberal property rights protections, has produced a violent, unequal society rife with corruption, which has become the only way Africans have been able to convert their political power into economic power.
In some regions of the country, especially the Southwest, Truth and Reconciliation seems to have been a step in the direction of a more equal, more inclusive, more integrated society. But as one travels northeast, closer to the gold and diamond mines, the core of the state’s economic power, the country seems as divided, as segregated as ever but with an array of private security forces and an incompetent and corrupt national constabulary replacing the old Ministry of Law and Order uber-cops.
Furthermore, as the national government devolves into a spoils system, pre-existing national divisions are increasing among black South Africans. Xhosa-Zulu relations are on the decline, to the point where the ancient corrupt vendu Bantustan leader of Kwazulu, Mangosutu Buthelezi is again a national political force. And all signs point to a continuing decline towards Kenya-style politics of great nations trapped in an endless petty fistfight over the table-leavings of neo-colonialism.
South Africa’s TRC was both a high price to pay to gain majority rule and, concurrently, a tiny amount of settler accountability bought at an astronomical price.
So why would Canada want to copy this?
It didn’t we just stole the name and put it on something emptier and worse.
More about that next.
