Politics of Identity – StuartParker.ca

The Age of Bizarro Churchill, the Outsourcing of Wife Beating and the Creation of the Super-Id

Beginning in the 1890s during the Boer Wars, Winston Churchill had a consistent response to whatever ailed the British people: “Attack! Attack now! Throw everything we’ve got at them!” That plan did not work out so well at Gallipoli and caused him to lose standing among the Coalition Liberals and British people but nevertheless, when the future kingdom of what would become Saudi Arabia began his insurgency against the British puppet ruling the British mandate of Hejaz, Churchill was back on form. It was time to conscript the young men and send them into the desert to prevent the rise of the Saudis.

But the world changed around Churchill. And because the world changed, and kept changing for the worse, one day in the 1930s it came to pass that Churchill was finally right. The correct answer to what the British were facing had become, “Attack! Attack now! Throw everything we’ve got at them!”

So they made him Prime Minister and, the rest, as they say, is history.

Today, we live in the age of Bizarro Churchill. The old man who is finally right is the person we are most certain is wrong.

It has been more than fifty years since Enoch Powell’s 1968 “Rivers of Blood” speech, more than thirty since Preston Manning tried to sell Canadians on dramatic cuts to our immigration rates and nominated racist MP candidates like Herb Grubel, Randy White, Bob Ringma and Philip Mayfield. Back in those days we were right to see panic over immigration as mainly driven by racial animus and bad “slippery slope” reasoning. We called Powell and Manning racists; we held rallies against Powell’s racism and Manning’s promiscuous flirtations with racists; and we were not wrong.

Back in the twentieth century, we were still relatively prosperous; we had strong institutions; most people could still afford their rent; and we had a robust civic nationalism structuring our multicultural pluralism, with flags and outfits and festivals that included all of us. Back then, activists opposing increased immigration were overwhelmingly old and white and the movements were rife with discredited race science and belief in eugenics.

Today, a clear majority of both white and non-white Canadians want immigration levels to be reduced to where they were when Stephen Harper’s Conservative Party was in office, approximately 20% of current levels. Those most supportive of current immigration levels tend to be white seniors, those who remember the odious politics of people like Powell, Manning and Ringma most vividly. Those least supportive are young people can have been pushed out of entry level jobs by temporary foreign workers and kids from the Global South on student visas and young families unable to find housing they can afford.

But the response from the courtiers and commissars who run our societies is not the way the British people responded to Churchill in the 1930s and 40s. Instead, they argue that supporting any kind of reduction to any kind of immigration is axiomatically wrong, that no matter what the migration situation is in a country, it is, by definition morally and politically wrong to restrict it in any way for any reason.

Instead of engaging logically with people recommending temporary or permanent reductions in migrant flow, they simply label anyone with an objection a hateful bigot and their ideas “hate speech,” what they call “stochastic terrorism,” the idea that if you say or even repeat a statement deemed “hateful,” you are in effect murdering members of a minority groups to whom the statement might refer.

Similarly, many conservatives acquitted themselves atrociously during the gay liberation movement and AIDS crisis. Lifesaving medication was denied to innocent people; their same sex partners were spitefully barred from visiting them in hospital; their partners’ pension spousal benefits were confiscated; and marriage was placed out of reach. In the 1980s, Andrew Dice Clay’s and Eddie Murphy’s stand-up performances ended far too frequently with the men who had laughed at the homophobic jokes performed going out and beating up innocent gay men.

Just as I attended anti-Reform Party rallies, I fought for gay rights and organized with Svend Robinson, Canada’s first openly gay MP.

But, as I warned at the time, we were taking shortcuts for which we would pay later. Instead of arguing that people have a right to marry whomever they want, we should have argued that, extending marriage rights to gay couples was a pro-social move of intrinsic that would make our societies better, not the creation of a new kind of right. Similarly, when we argued that we should never judge people for the weird sex they like, I thought: “this is heading for trouble.”

But, the Bizarro Churchill effect is, of course, present on questions of human sexuality now. If men need to wear diapers and shit themselves in the street in front of us, dance provocatively in sexualized getups in front of grade schoolers and wave their junk teenage girls in locker rooms, who are we to judge them? After all, if objecting to one form of male sexuality showing up in public was wrong in the 80s, objecting to any form of male sexuality asserting itself in any context is inherently wrong at all times and places.

And so those of us who object to Genderwang and are trying to protect gay kids from being sterilized and mutilated are bigots, hatemongers and, most ironically, “homophobes.” Last fall, when the Million March for Kids took place, once credible journalists ran stories stating that those of us in the march were planning to hunt down homosexuals and beat them up, just like those Clay and Murphy fans in the 80s. The BC government even sent warning to daycare centres that we were coming to assault the gender-confused children there.

In the 1990s and 00s, we fought against Ronald Reagan’s Drug War, worked for safe injection sites, decriminalization of hard drugs, supportive housing for addicts and freeing those convicted of drug offenses from prison. Like my work on welcoming immigrants and civil equality for gays and lesbians, I remain proud of this work and glad I did it.

But now we face a situation where, as reported by Adam Zivo in the National Post, we have a government program in BC that allows teenagers to receive hard recreational drugs from the province and have the state act to keep that secret from parents, literally slipping children fentanyl and telling them not to tell mom, thanks to the terrible precedent set by administering Lupron to teenagers secretly.

But again, object to there being too many drugs out there, as the government increases the drug supply, as no credible academic study has ever recommended, or object to how young the people are that we’re giving addictive drugs to or even simply suggest that being a full-time unhoused drug addict is a less worthwhile life than having a job and a family and once again, one is accused of hate speech, bigotry and stochastic terrorism. The next overdose will be blamed on us—as though you can’t OD on “safe supply” fentanyl.

Again, because conservatives were wrong about something in the past, they cannot possibly be right about it now. And anyone who agrees with them now has become a “far right” “hatemonger.”

Violence Against Women and the Rise of the Super-Id
I used to think this was just some sort of cognitive error that was producing these three highly similar social phenomena where all problems caused by out-of-control immigration can only be solved by fewer immigration controls, all problems caused by drug use can only be solved by more drugs and all problems caused by Genderwang can only be solved by de-stigmatizing “minor attracted persons” and conferring on people the right to have their bodies made into surreal Japanese hentai monsters at government expense.

But a recent chat with a very important gender critical thinker convinced me that this is something darker:

The other thing that changed in our society in the 1980s was our fairly successful crackdown on domestic violence and marital rape. Wife-beating, of course, continued. But it had to be closeted in new ways. Even celebrities who publicly advocated it were smacked down hard or the media edited their backwards views out of their interviews. Male violence against women was attacked both by law enforcement with a new zeal and, at the same time, Hollywood and the news media came together to stigmatize this vile behaviour.

But we didn’t fix the men or address the underlying causes and so violent misogyny has been building up as behind a dam since the 1980s. And the inhibitions and prohibitions around white men and respectable men hitting and sexually assaulting women have never been greater, especially in progressive communities.

And so this violent misogyny has found a vent. Pakistani grooming gangs in England do have permission to rape, beat and traffic women; so do men in dresses; so do homeless men on meth. And that is why our governments are now admitting young, male rootless immigrants at a higher rate than other immigrants, proposing, as BC’s chief medical health officer recently did a chain of meth stores like our stores that market cannabis products in a friendly atmosphere, but for crystal meth.

White progressive men have outsourced their misogynistic violence to three groups of men. It is an exchange: these men enact the misogynistic violence and rage of the commissar class towards women and, in exchange, the commissar class describes them as victims and grants them total immunity from the consequences of their actions, not just legally but socially.

The Woke ideologies that enable this are a kind of Super-Id our society has built itself. A psychological force that uses ideology to push our collective behaviour beyond even where your average unrestrained male id would go.

Authoritarianism Canadian Politics Politics of Epistemology Politics of Identity Public Discourse on Sexual and Gender-based Violence | fusangite | August 19, 2024

Breast Gropes, Rabbit Punches and the Politics of Fear at Versailles: How Machiavelli’s the Prince Helps Us Understand the Paris Olympics

Every single time I write a gender critical blog post, a feel a very familiar feeling: fear deep in the pit of my stomach, rising through my abdomen and reaching up to choke my throat. Despite having begun my gender critical writing almost five years ago, not only am I still scared every time I publish an essay like this, I am no less scared than I was the previous time. That is because there is always something to lose, always the possibility of new “consequences” as Wokes call them for expressing my opinion that men cannot become women; women cannot become men; it is wrong to sterilize and chemically lobotomize children; etc.

In today’s essay I want to explore that fear more thoroughly because I grow more convinced every day that almost everyone’s experience of the strange new social movement with which the West is wrestling is being primarily conditioned by fear; and the antics we saw at the Paris Olympics are just the latest demonstration of that.

And because I remain committed to continuing to try and awaken in my former comrades the courage necessary to challenge not just Genderwang but the larger authoritarian project as whose vanguard it functions, even though every time I pen an article like this I inevitably lose another few comrades and friends, despite my views on this subject being unchanged over the past five years. Just this week since the last essay, I lost a couple more. That’s because even though my views have not changed, the danger of being publicly associated with heretical views only increases every year in the Progressiverse as its inhabitants habituate themselves to the existence of an ever more demanding grassroots Holy Inquisition.

Re-reading Machiavelli in the 2020s
So, really, what this piece is about is what we might call “the politics of fear,” a profoundly misunderstood term today. The idea of a fear-centred politics was first strongly theorized in Nicolo Machiavelli’s The Prince in 1513. It is my view that, from the outset, the meanings and lessons of the text were based on a fundamental misreading of the historically contingent character of its arguments because later interpreters were unacquainted with Renaissance humanist readings of Roman history.

Throughout the text, Machiavelli invokes important Roman historical actors in a series of lessons about how to do politics successfully. Most readers understand The Prince as illustrating which the author believed to be hard, permanent proto-social scientific truths. But to one with at least a passing familiarity with Roman history and with the Renaissance humanist movement’s worldview, this does not seem quite right.

Typically, when Machiavelli refers to a past actor like the Roman general Scipio, who was both successful in their politics and laudable in their principles, he uses them as an example of what not to do if one wants to succeed in sixteenth-century Italian politics. Similarly, when he wants to use an historical example of politics that would work, he typically serves up the example of a villain, tyrant or, at least, a fatally flawed historical actor.

I take this highly strategic and self-conscious use of historical references to indicate not that he is talking about what makes a prince wise and successful irrespective of when and where he rules but to relay the following subtext: “Italy has entered into some kind of hell dimension in my time; if the best and most virtuous rulers and warriors of the past existed in sixteenth-century Italy, they would fail whereas the most venal and villainous of past actors would succeed.” In this way, I read The Prince both as a piece of absolutely sincere practical advice to the warlords and oligarchs of Italy in 1513 and as an absolute indictment of the time and place in which he lived.

Maybe this is just projection but I feel the same way about contemporary politics in the Global North. And that is because how to succeed at the politics of fear has changed to Machiavelli’s from its opposite in the space of a decade.

When I was growing up in last years of Cold War welfare state society, people believed that they were witnessing the rise of a new “politics of fear.” What this meant was that, until the mid-2010s, political candidates and parties focused increasing effort on making potential supporters fear their opponent. The term “hidden agenda” was used with increasing frequency, especially against conservative parties and candidates but was used across the board. The idea was that if you could make a group of voters fear what your opponent might do to them, they would vote for you defensively.

Single women in their child-bearing years were often the targets of the most successful fear politics. We are coming up on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Liberal Party of Canada making the “hidden agenda” of their conservative opponents to re-criminalize abortion a centrepiece of their political communication every election. Conservative parties also did an impressive job, warning of the impacts of unrestricted immigration and “soft on crime” approaches to criminal justice.

Machiavelli would not have called this “the politics of fear,” nor would he have given such a politics much of a chance of success in sixteenth-century Italy. In fact, he would predict that in Renaissance Florence, such an approach would actually help one’s political adversary. In his chapter on fear as a political force, his argument was that a wise prince rejects the love of his people in favour of their fear, that the more the popular classes fear you, the more they will support you, and that while the people’s love can be sustained for only a time, their fear can be sustained indefinitely.

As the 2010s wore on and people’s sense of financial, environmental and social security continued to wane, the politics of Florence under the Medici family was reborn. And its midwife was Donald Trump. Of course, before Trump could become politically successful, the kind of fear and hopelessness that pervaded Machiavelli’s world had to creep up. And there were signs that a growing portion of the Global North would be ready for this kind of politics to return. People had to become more psychologically and materially insecure and frightened before Trumpism could work on them.

A true Machiavellian politics of fear works on a set of interlocking psychological bases in such an environment:

The Ivan the Terrible Effect
Ivan the Terrible was a popular Tsar and remained popular long after his death because he ruled in a time when Russians were extremely insecure as the Mongol Khanates that had ruled the Pontic steppe continued their violent destabilizing breakup, following Muscovy’s successful war of independence to separate itself from the Golden Horde.

Just like the Comanche or any expansionist equestrian pastoralist society, the imperial Mongol civilization was successful because they struck fear into the heart of local agrarian and agro-pastoralist populations, often by engaging in gratuitous acts of murder, property destruction and sexual violence.

Ivan the Terrible was successful in rallying former subjects of the Horde and incorporating them into the expanding Russian state not by sharpening the contrast between how things worked in his Christian kingdom and how they worked in the Horde but by reducing it by demonstrating novel forms of gratuitous cruelty and violence.

Ivan formed the original ancestor of today’s SVR. Before the KGB, before NKVD, before Cheka, there were the Oprichniki, an army of black-clad riders with rotting dogs’ and wolves’ heads tied to their saddles, completely above and outside the law, who conducted massacres of unspeakable and pointless cruelty and debauchery. Ivan often led this host, with an iron wolf’s head mounted on his horse. Ivan was not just “terrible” in this context; he was also known for having beaten his own son to death for no apparent reason.

Yet he enjoyed considerable popular support because his subjects felt that they were, on balance, safer being led by a monster because he possessed the capacity to strike fear into the otherwise fearless Mongols.

When you are staring down the barrel of something scary that you perceive to be a terrifying external or alien force, there is a terrible logic to supporting a leader who has proven his worth by perpetrating atrocities indiscriminately against his own people.

And this appeal is a gendered one, not one unique to women but one more concentrated in women because they are more likely to have been sexually interfered with as children or physically terrorized in a romantic relationship. People who have had these experiences, male or female, often seek out romantic partners not on the basis that they will be gentle and different but that they will be so “formidable” (a more accurate translation of Ivan’s actual title) that they will frighten off the other violent abusers.

Reaction Formation
People who voted for Trump because he would stand up to China, stare down Mexican migration or kick the drug dealers out of town, were conscious in their embrace of the politics of fear: Trump was a scary, seemingly invulnerable bastard whose aggression was largely directed away from them and towards the things they discerned to be threats. But those credentials did not just come from his affect. They came from how he had treated business partners, employees, investors and even his own family members, proudly calling his daughter “a hot piece of ass” on the Howard Stern show, for instance. The people who consciously imbibed this politics of fear were largely middle and working class white men to whom Trump was not that scary in the first place.

But for women like a former girlfriend of mine who grew up with a father, and major Republican donor I might add, who made his violent sexual fantasies about her a regular part of family dinner conversation, this kind of response is less conscious and rational, more instinctive, inchoate and hard-wired.

Survivors of child and domestic abuse and violence have an instinct to placate an emotionally dysregulated, powerful, potentially violent man, irrespective of whether that behaviour makes them safer. Reaction formation is a form of double consciousness that enables and conceals this.

Because those experiencing it feel profoundly unsafe but deem themselves unable to escape or reduce their unsafety, like an abused spouse or child, they become vehement, passionate and insistent that the thing that is terrifying them is VERY SAFE, 100% SAFE. If they cannot control their safety, they can at least control their feelings about it. I first made this argument when observing that the Canadians most insistent that anthropogenic climate change is not happening are those whose lives and communities are most endangered by it. The climate has to not be changing; that’s the only way to feel safe.

As I stated at the time, I believe that the two big poll surges Trump experienced among married white women, the day he accepted the GOP nomination and Election Day, were powered by his campaign’s brilliant mastery of the intuitive logic of reaction formation.

Trump chose to give his daughter an open-mouthed kiss and grab her ass on live TV at the moment he knew the most people would be watching. He understood, whether intuitively or consciously, that he could most effectively demonstrate his power by violating the incest taboo as publicly as possible and then watch as no one at the GOP convention attempted to stop or condemn him. As I wrote at the time,

And it is in this light that we must understand the programmatic, intentional and strategic marketing of parent-child incest by Donald Trump. Trump chose to give the convention address, reserved for generations for the spouse of a presidential candidate, to his daughter Ivanka. This choice was intentional and premeditated, as was his unambiguously libidinous kissing and ass-grabbing of his daughter on national TV before the address, the daughter about whom he has been making sexualized comments in the media since before her tenth birthday. Trump is direct, clear and unflinching in notifying America that he owns that girl’s ass and has since she was conceived.

Trump successfully activated reaction formation in survivors (not all survivors but many) across the country; they denied what they saw as abused spouses often do when they see their own children abused; they became more desirous of pleasing and complying with his will; and, most importantly, they became vehement in their denials that he was dangerous and predatory.

The sad fact is that survivors who have not adequately addressed their own experience of abuse, especially those still engaged in placating their abuser on a regular basis, are more likely to speak up in favour of the abuser, as a deep-seated subconscious self-protective strategy, and, to further protect themselves, conceal from their own consciousness what they are doing and why.

The next surge, one long-debated by pollsters and other psephologists, was the iconic photograph of Trump looking over his wife’s shoulder and watching her fill out her ballot on election day, 2016.

As I wrote at the time,

As we learn—but never accept—in countless failed rape prosecutions, people who have been sexually violated, especially people who have been sexually violated by adults as children do not reliably say “no.” They do not reliably ostracize their abuser or reject his future overtures. They do not reliably resist further infringements on their bodies, dignity and sense of self. That is because one of the most powerful lessons a survivor of sexual abuse learns is this: their abuser is all-powerful and nobody will help them…

For most survivors, the way forward would be clear: dissemble and comply. Somehow your abuser will know if you tried to thwart him. In all likelihood, your abuser wants you to generate a narrative that you have consented, that he has done nothing wrong. Ultimately, the greatest performances of domination are the ones that inspire feigned consent. What if the moment, America’s survivors placed their hands on that lever, they felt their omnipresent, omnipotent abuser leaning over the flimsy cardboard privacy partition, their eyes full of malice, and knew what they must do to survive another day?

The Politics of Fear Come to the Olympics
In my efforts to explain the Democratic Party’s unexpectedly good showing in the 2022 midterm elections, I suggested that it could be accounted-for by the Democrats adopting the fundamental logic of Trumpian campaigning, of seeking to make the voters more frightened of them, of presenting as their representative, the most emotionally dysregulated, abusive person in the room. Trump, in a way, has become obsolete. He is now replaceable because the logic of his political strategy has been embraced by all.

At the start of the Paris Olympics, many of us gender critical folks were anticipating a good week because two men were going to be boxing women on TV. These men, furthermore, checked none of the boxes that characters like Dylan Mulvaney use to distance themselves aesthetically or rhetorically from their masculinity.

Imane Khelif did not merely look just like a man, complete with Adam’s Apple and a hulking manly build; he “lived as a man” in Algeria and gave interviews about manliness and masculinity directed to an audience of other men; he did not wear a hijab, as Muslim Algerian women do; he had a deep voice; he walked like a man; he even adjusted the position of his scrotum in front of us on live TV; and he had been disqualified from international women’s boxing the previous year because he had been found to have XY chromosomes.

This was going to be a slam dunk, we thought: people will see a man punching a woman in the face. And that is what we saw. What followed, we did not expect: all kinds of people previously sympathetic to gender critical positions, including materialist radical feminists, became supporters of Genderwang and vigorously defended his status as a woman on social media. Even the Italian woman he savaged recanted her opposition to being beaten by a man and apologized for saying what happened was unfair. And that support grew throughout the week as a second male boxer also began beating women in the ring.

I want to suggest that this is best explained by two iconic images from the boxing ring:

In the first, Imane Khelif gropes the right breast of Angela Carini immediately after humiliating her in the ring. In the second, Lin Yu-Ting illegally rabbit-punches his female opponent on the back of the neck, using a dangerous attack that could have left even a male opponent permanently disabled. And the referee did nothing.

Now, whether these acts were carefully planned or merely serendipitous and intuitive is utterly irrelevant. This essay has no interest in the consciousness of Khelif or Lin. My interest is in the consciousness of the audience.

This was visual rhetoric on a par with the those two images of the 2016 Trump campaign. They said, unambiguously: men can abuse women under the justifying discourse of Genderwang in front of the entire world, surrounded by supposed professional arbiters of fairness and nothing will happen. Not only can they engage in this abuse with impunity; the will do so to thunderous applause, and even make their victim apologize to them for saying they were victimized.

Now I am not writing this to complain or lament the state of humanity today or even to grieve the latest batch of friends I have lost but as a wake-up call to critics of the authoritarians: we have to stop pretending that this is a battle of wits, of analysis, of information. Those things mean nothing at this phase of the debate. The worst argument and the best argument we can make will elicit identical reactions because if we actually put on our thinking caps and stop distracting ourselves by pretending that sounding smart and informed is going to move the needle, we have to recognize that this is a contest about human consciousness of power and safety. That’s it.

Our rhetoric must cease to address the fight we wish we were in, between the bad and good analysis, between bad and good information, and start addressing what is actually animating it: performances of power and terror, the Machiavellian politics of fear.

Authoritarianism Politics of Epistemology Politics of Identity Public Discourse on Sexual and Gender-based Violence | fusangite | August 10, 2024

The Anti-Cosmopolitian City – Part 3: The Problem of the Self-Made

When we think about the term “self-made” we usually associate it with a semi-apocryphal Horatio Alger story of how a rich man made himself rich. But the reality is that bootstrap narratives are just one kind of self-making practice and, as our culture has come to prize self-making to an ever greater degree, they represent a smaller minority.

For this reason, as social scientists have grown more interested in the phenomenon, they have coined a synonymous term for it, “self-fashioning,” to refer to all social practices of seeing one’s reputation and image as something one primarily owns and controls, oneself.

While I am a highly attention-seeking person, I am not a self-fashioner probably because I am a lousy actor and am incapable of pretending to be anyone other than myself for any extended period of time. But I would also like to think that, like most reasonably well-adjusted people, I do not believe in self-fashioning as a practice nor in a worldviews that validate and underpin those practices.

The reality is that who we are to other people is something they own; we do not own other people’s thoughts and opinions about us. They are part of them, not us. Our identities are what I typically term “intersubjective.” Needless to say, I have spilled a fair bit of ink attacking the way Genderwang pronoun politics are a direct assault on that intersubjectivity, by arguing that our opinions about other people are part of them, not part of us. This is even framed in the discourse of “rights,” in which supposedly I have the right to be talked about by third parties in ways consistent with my self-image and to stop them talking about me in ways inconsistent with who I think I am.

But Genderwang is the exception, at least for now, in that most self-fashioning projects are not backed up by the long arm of the law or the threat of unemployment and public shaming. Most self-fashioning projects are conducted primarily through acts of persuasion, acting and, most relevant to this essay series, relocation.

We need look no further than the Gospels to see what an important tool urbanization is in the self-fashioner’s toolbox. When Jesus visits his home town of Nazareth, no one there will believe he is the Son of God or the Messiah; they won’t even believe he is a competent exorcist or interpreter of scripture. “And he said, ‘Truly I tell you, no prophet is accepted in his hometown.’” Luke 4:24. In other words, no one who watched you grow up is going to be convinced of your new special identity.

In healthy societies, prophets and other sorts of self-fashioners are few and far between. But, as Monty Python so brilliantly observed in The Life of Brian half a century ago, the culture of the New Left shares with Judea and Samaria in the era of Jesus, John the Baptist, Dositheus and Simon Magus a culture generative of self-fashioning projects.

In most healthy societies, who people think you are is not something people believe they have much of a choice about. Especially in village-based societies, your identity just naturally accretes to you. People form an idea of who you are based on their shared experiences with you, the associates you surround yourself with, the work you do to make a living. You discover who you are as people develop expectations about you, tell stories about you, confer nicknames on you. Your identity is not something you make but something you co-discover with the people around you.

In societies and subcultures where self-fashioning is more acceptable and valued as a behaviour, it tends to produce certain kinds of social morbidities. If you believe that who you are as a person can be and should be controllable by acts of persuasion, manipulation and/or coercion, people tend to have a more fragile, defensive sense of self. By conflating who one is with who one is considered to be and then stating that this is something one both can and should primarily control, one produces people who are less honest and more fragile, especially when we decide that our reputations are owned not by everyone but us but by ourselves.

Such societies often become obsessed with social rank and categorization, like the eighteenth century Spanish Empire, in which the empire’s original four racial categories mushroomed into dozens. Such societies also generate more complex and coercive systems of etiquette in which people are punished for such things as incorrect forms of address and levels of grammatical formality. They also tend to be prone to the pursuit of personal vendettas based around putative injuries to one’s social body, a kind of social system we call “honour culture,” in which the infliction of physical or financial damage is viewed as a reasonable and commensurate reaction to acts perceived as reputational assaults.

Those most committed to creating and burnishing their self-made reputations are naturally going to be over-represented among intolerant urbanizers. Not only does urbanization make self-fashioning possible; the very way intolerant urbanizers is part of the self-fashioning project in that it reifies the character, the nature of the place they have moved and then fuses that reified nature with the self. For the intolerant urbanizer, moving to a city like Victoria or Nelson is not just about getting to reset one’s reputation; it is about deciding that their new city embodies a laudable characteristic, like healthy living or a high THC tolerance, a characteristic they admire or aspire to and wish to incorporate into the self they are fashioning.

Furthermore, intolerant urbanizers are often genuinely escaping communities lacking in tolerance, diversity and heterodoxy. But while this means, on one hand, that they prize their own freedom from the confines of their former community, it also means that they have been raised with the habits of mind of an intolerant villager, habits to which they may naturally revert when stressed or confused.

For many years, cities have been awash in self-fashioning urbanizers with few adverse social effects. And, on the streets of our cities, aside from compulsory Pharma Pride signage and regalia, there is little immediately visible sign of our emerging intolerant urban honour culture. The modern phenomenon of the intolerant urbanizer is mitigated, opposed even, by the intrinsically cosmopolitan nature of urban space, with different sorts of people pushed together onto the same streets, into the same stores, the same government offices, etc.

It is primarily the synergistic effects of social media technologies and the rise of neo-McCarthyism that have transformed merely fragile self-fashioners into the backbone of the new urban intolerance. The politics of neo-McCarthyism is one profoundly concerned with questions of purity, pollution and contagion. I am not exceptional in that what actually triggered my cancelation was my defense of a canceled person. The sole demand of a cancelation campaign is for people to sever all social links to the object of the campaign lest they themselves become infected, polluted.

By giving their subscribers the ability, for free, to police this new politics of purity and pollution, to monitor, minute-to-minute the “friends,” and “followers” of those they know, Facebook, Twitter and their ilk have made possible forms of exclusion and ostracism inconceivable on the sidewalk of a cosmopolitan city but possible through the data networks covering that city. Worse than the “friends” lists are the photos. Appearing in photographs with me or other canceled people on Instagram or Facebook is socially costly to progressives because photos are indicative of a genuine social connection and ongoing relationship.

For self-fashioners, the consequences of one’s carefully curated public image being polluted, contaminated, goes beyond the material risks of cancelation. Not only does your reputation change against your will, the control over that reputation that you have carefully developed over years vanishes. It is not merely that your identity changes into one you like less; the control you exert over that identity is immediately and permanently diminished, undermining not just your current self-fashioning project but any future acts of self-fashioning.

It is not as much out of a greater commitment to progressive orthodoxy that intolerant urbanizers are the leaders in creating a new, more intolerant urban social contract as it is out of a greater fear on the part of this group. But because fear is the greatest chameleon of emotions, they can hide that fear behind acts of performative outrage.

Essentially, our social media has villagized, in unprecedented ways, key aspects of the urban social contract, just as it has urbanized, in equally unprecedented ways key aspects of rural social contracts. And so, what we are seeing in our newly intolerant cities, is the Janus face of Marshall McLuhan’s “global village.”

Authoritarianism Politics of Identity | fusangite | July 31, 2024

The Last Good Year: The Politics of Time Travel in 2024

In 1997, Canadian literary icon Pierre Berton published 1967: The Last Good Year. It was not his best work. It made him seem old, stuck in the past, yearning for a simpler time that probably never existed, seen through the rose-tinted bifocals of a once-great man of letters. The idea that one can reach back in time to find some past moment of pristine fairness or decency has been a popular one for as long as people have been conscious of social change over time.

In Classical Greece, this idea that we live in a fundamentally inferior order was already well-established and beautifully articulated in Hesiod’s Works and Days, which described a succession of ages, from Golden, to Silver, to Bronze to the Age of Heroes, ending with the Iron Age in which he lived.

This idea of somehow returning to a past age of decency has long been a staple of traditionalist and conservative politics. Ronald Reagan and Donald Trump channeled that idea with their use of “Make America Great Again” as their political rallying cry. But, as I have observed before, as progressive time consciousness has continued to collapse under the weight of its contradictions and the messy complexities of actual history, this kind of discourse has ceased to be monopolized by movements calling themselves conservative or traditional.

Indigenous neo-traditionalism, the ideology within which the Canadian judiciary effectively forces indigenous people desiring land reform to operate, has received a lot of cultural patronage, despite it being a family of beliefs held by a minority of indigenous people, and concentrated among those with strong financial and political incentives to espouse it e.g. indigenous academics, state-patronized entertainers and artists, and members of pre-colonial aristocratic lineages whom the courts have declared are the sole legitimate representatives of indigenous people’s interests on off-reserve unceded territory.

Nostalgia, traditionalism, neo-traditionalism: these are forces that have been with us for some time. But I want to suggest that a new kind of traditionalist discourse of history is emerging as a global force: Pierre Berton’s idea of a “last good year.”

I was disappointed by Vladimir Putin and Tucker Carlson’s conversation. I am sure that if I had to sit across from Putin, who has certainly personally killed people with his hands and has ordered the deaths of thousands, I would have come off as a cowardly sycophant too. But then I have never claimed to be competent to interview a man like Putin. Putin, for his part, seemed unable to understand that he was dealing with a submissive, supportive interviewer and engaged in all sorts of antics to gratuitously dominate Carlson, to show who was boss every second of the interview, no matter how that might play to the home audience in the West.

But the interview did have a highlight or two. Putin observed that it seems as though everyone has decided on some arbitrary year in the past when the international borders were fair. He then wryly added that if we were going to play that game, he was picking 1648, the year that the Cossacks overran Ukraine, seized it from Poland and established the Hetmanate.

While Putin spoke half tongue in cheek, the reality is that a new historical consciousness is sweeping through various social movements, who take this idea of moving millions of people around and stripping them of their political rights quite seriously if it can transport it back to the Last Good Year.

1648: The Year of Orthodox Slavic Unity and Heroism
While Putin clearly believes that Russia should be a multi-ethnic, multi-confessional state, he also clearly believes it should be one led by Eastern Orthodox Slavs like himself. This is not an uncommon or critical belief for a pluralistic order. All pluralism is structured by the theory of pluralism held by one of the groups in society more than another. The so-called “post-national” Canada is, after all, animated not by some kind of neutral compromise theory of social organization but by a minority who have converted to a novel American space religion during the Third Great Awakening.

For this reason, even as he sells off pieces of the Amur region to the Chinese government, he remains focused extending his territorial hegemony over Orthodox Ukrainians, Georgians, Moldovans and Armenians. Reincorporating the Russian exclave of Transneustria in Moldova and the Donbas and Crimean regions of Ukraine have extended into multi-decade projects this year, as has his relentless domination of Belarus through his satrap Aleksandr Lukashenko.

For Putin, the foundation of Russian greatness is clearly Orthodox Slavic unity. And so, it is not so much the territory of 1648 that he seeks to recapture; Russia was smaller then, not yet an empire, still struggling to challenge Swedish hegemony in the Baltic and eliminate the Khanates of Northeast Asia. What matters to him is the triumphant march of the Cossacks into Kiev, the way the Ukrainians welcomed their liberators who established a united territory encompassing present-day Moldova and Ukraine, under Russian patronage.

1763: The Year of the Royal Proclamation
Although “land acknowledgements” have become a cultural practice that has spread as a ritual act into the United States of America, the most repeated aspects of their ritual speech is based on a legal doctrine developed and propounded by Canadian courts. The term “unceded territory,” for most of the history of these ceremonial speeches was not about all North American land but specific land that had not been ceded by treaty.

Much of the East Coast of North America had been ceded by treaty by 1763. While we might have criticisms of the treaties with the Wampanoag, Narragansett, the Powhatan Confederacy, the Mi’kmaq, the Abenaki, etc. that they were signed under duress, poorly understood, not fully honoured—the list of legitimate grievances goes on—treaties were signed and land was ceded.

But, as the demography of North America became increasingly lopsided in favour of the English settlers, and following the cession of Eastern Louisiana to the British following France and Spain losing the Seven Years War, English settlers began moving into the new territories without any effort to conclude treaties. This had already been a problem was what had actually touched off the global war in 1754 with George Washington and Iroquois ambassador Tanacharison’s fateful confrontation with the French and their indigenous allies in Ohio Country.

Between 1763 and 1775, the British Empire rolled out a series of laws designed to calm tensions in its New World colonies and also to pay down the massive war debt through new taxes and fees. While we hear a lot about the Hat Act and the Stamp Act, we hear rather less about the Royal Proclamation of 1763, the first document to put forward the legal doctrine of “unceded territory.” The Proclamation only applied to the traditional territories of indigenous peoples who had no pre-existing treaty with the British.

One of the first things the new US government did, following their successful revolution was to tear-up the Proclamation. They would pursue treaties case-by-case, when they suited the United States.

But to the #Landback movement, 1763 is the last good year, the last fair year. People descended from African, European or Asian settlers living west of Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, New France and the Thirteen Colonies should be stripped of their democratic and property rights and either shelter in place with the consent of the local hereditary indigenous aristocrats or be repatriated to… wherever their family was living in 1763, I suppose. Because 1763 was that brief shining moment when land was fairly governed and distributed, somehow.

To deal with the fact that much of North America, with hunter-gatherer or village-based societies, ravaged by Virgin Soil epidemics of Eurasian disease, their populations decimated did not have the state capacity in 1763 to govern their vast territories in any kind of recognizable way, I have noticed that people who believe in this particular Last Good Year theory like circulating a map of indigenous language groups via social media, typically with the comment “we never learned about these nations in school,” falsely implying that our state education system has been covering up the existence of large, organized pre-colonial polities in places like Northern Saskatchewan and the Nevada Desert.

Unlike Putin’s “last good year,” which at least is based on accurate maps and a certain level of demographic consistency, the restoration of 1763 North America is, as I said in my essay on the #Landback movement neither possible nor desirable and is actually an impossibilist obstacle to the just and urgent need to reform Canada’s land tenure system and uplift rural indigenous people from poverty.

1947: Palestine’s Last Good Year
The only map I have spent more time fruitlessly arguing about on Facebook the past year is the map of British Mandatory Palestine in 1947. #BDS with its “right of return” doctrine takes a similar position to the #Landback movement: that we just need to move everyone in Israel-Palestine to wherever their family was living in 1947 because 1947 is the last year the borders in the region were fair. We would send the Sephardim to North Africa, the Ashkenazi to Eastern Europe, the Mizrahi to Baghdad and Cairo… oh wait… that might be a problem. Some of the Mizrahi were the descendants of the Jews of Israel, Judea and the Herodian state. Where to send them?

The map is often accompanied by the claim that Palestine has always been a country and will soon be a country again. This is an absolutely bananas fantasy, easily disproven by the most cursory reading of history. British Mandatory Palestine was a colony ruled from London by Englishmen. It was founded over the vehement objections of the ancestors of the Palestinians who strongly supported the creation of a state called “Greater Syria” which would have incorporated present-day Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Gaza, Golan and the West Bank.

The decision to create Lebanon and Israel was taken not by residents of the region but by British and French negotiators at meetings held in Paris. France wished to create a country with a slim Roman Catholic majority, a group of Arabs in the Mount Lebanon region south of Beirut that the French had been patronizing since the days of Charlemagne. Although Beirut was a mostly Sunni Arab city, its annexation to the new Christian country of Lebanon was seen as necessary to make it more economically dynamic.

The British government of David Lloyd George was informed by some eccentric eschatological beliefs of held by the Prime Minister. He believed that the Zionist movement that had been buying up scrub land from the Ottoman Empire and settling European Jews in present-day Israel was a sign of the impending eschaton when the Jews would gather in the former territory of Israel and Judah and then be attacked by a neighbouring country from “the North.” (The “Tribes of the North” reading of the Book of Revelation has long informed Christian philo-Semitism and its role in the Reagan Administration was documented in Fred Knellman’s Reagan, God and the Bomb.)

But it also had practical reasons behind it. Arthur Balfour, at one time considered Lloyd George’s likely successor had promised to accelerate Ashkenazi Jewish migration and land acquisition if the Zionist movement supported the British during the Great War.

But let us be clear: neither Palestine nor Lebanon had ever been an independent state and they did not become so in 1921 when they were created by the stroke of a pen on another continent.

The ancestors of the Palestinians boycotted every election the British held in the territory, refused to co-govern a country they deemed an illegitimate fiction. And despite their differences with the Zionist newcomers to the region, both Arabs and Jews waged intermittent guerilla wars against the colonial government of Palestine from 1921 to 1948, when it was forced to withdraw thanks to their combined campaigns of bombing and terrorism.

The idea there was something fair about these borders or the government of this colonially occupied non-state seems to have welled-up out of nowhere.

634: The Last Good Year in the Levant
Sometimes if a stupid and unproductive idea becomes popular enough, people cease countering it with reasonable ideas, especially when reasonable positions have increasing political costs. The totally inappropriate application of the idea of “aboriginal” or “indigenous” to Palestinian Arabs and the conflation of North American colonialism of indigenous peoples and the social order of Israel and the territories it occupies has permitted a very stupid debate to take place.

Palestinian Arabs are not an indigenous people. Of course they mixed with local Greek, Jewish, Samaritan and other populations when they arrived in large numbers in the Levant during the expansion of the Rashidun Caliphate in 634 but that doesn’t make them indigenous in the sense of being an “original” people, like, for instance, the Maori of New Zealand. Also, unlike Polynesian and Amerindian colonized populations, their societies were not decimated (literally) by the arrival of new diseases. There were no virgin soil epidemics and no catastrophic population declines.

Unlike most supporters of the idea of Zionism, as espoused by people like Theodore Hertzl and Shimon Peres, I am sympathetic to the idea that if there is any arrangement to compare Israel-Palestine to, it is late-phase South African apartheid under PW Botha. Gaza and the West Bank are not unlike the townships and Bantustans of 1980s South Africa, in that they are populated by the residents of fake countries ruled by strongman dictators and who are required to use passes to enter Israel, the real country, where many of their jobs are but where they have no citizenship rights. Certainly, there are Arab citizens of Israel who do enjoy full democratic rights but they do not comprise the majority of Arabs contained in the territory Israel occupies.

The problem is that unlike Ciskei, Transkei and Kwazulu in the 1980s, Israel’s Bantustans and townships are shrinking, because Israeli politics has become a spoils system. It has become nigh-impossible to assemble sixty-one votes in the Knesset needed to form a government, without the support of the parties of land-hungry settlers.

Between the need to justify this constant encroachment on Palestinian territory and the eviction of Palestinian Arabs from their land, and because the discourse of indigeneity has been so effectively abused by Palestine solidarity movement, we are now hearing a mirror discourse: that Jews as the true indigenous people of the region should kick out those evil settler-colonialist Arabs and end their 1390-year “occupation.”

It is not just Kahanists and supporters of the Greater Israel fantasy pushing this. Where I am seeing it is from pragmatic fans Likud’s territorial ambitions and apologists for their punitive expedition to Gaza. Why should the Gazans have rights? Have meaningful citizenship? Have land? One moment tongue in cheek, one moment deadly serious, the assertion of Jewish indigeneity has become increasingly powerful rhetorically in this intellectual and humanitarian race to the bottom.

If we can go back to 1947, why not 634? If we can go back to 1763, why not 1634? Why is one year fairer than the other? These Last Good Year arguments are a morass of historical revisionism, submerged ethnonationalism, post-political rhetoric and outright fantasy. But we can’t cherry-pick which one we dismantle. They all have to go.

Canadian Politics Politics of Identity Race Religion and Eschatology in Politics | fusangite | July 2, 2024

The Spread of the Culture War and the New Politics of Denial and Superstition

Election Results from the European Union
Many of my former comrades are wringing their hands about the turn European elections are taking these days. They worry that various “far right” parties are taking Europe by storm and are about to create authoritarian fascist regimes that suppress people’s basic political rights, such as their freedom of assembly, speech and movement.

But the reality is that many of these parties, while historically right-wing and anti-immigration, are fueled by anti-authoritarian voters who are already experiencing progressive, globalist governments limiting their freedom of assembly, speech and movement. Parties like Alliance for Germany, Brothers of Italy and Reform UK certainly do have their share of disturbing supporters and do fan the flames of nativism.

But to everyday folks, these parties are the only ones promising to stop jailing people for refusing to use wrong-sex pronouns, stop working with Big Tech and the American Military-Industrial Complex to censor and surveil our everyday communications, explore a policy of détente rather than escalation on Europe’s Eastern border, safeguard people’s right not to be fired for political wrongthink and keep men out of women’s sports and spaces. They are the parties that express respect for farmers, veterans and other vocations admired by the working class but belittled by the commissars.

So I think the fear that these parties represent anything other than, at absolute worst, a lateral move, when it comes to people’s political rights and basic freedoms. Furthermore, these is no evidence to suggest that continuing to ramp up migration into societies unable to handle such high levels is somehow going to produce less “hate” towards minorities than the migration restriction policies of the European right. Let us remember that, when fascism was first on the rise in the 1920s, it was pragmatic reductions in migration that helped to calm tensions, reduce anti-immigrant violence and prevent the rise of fascism in many countries, including the US and Canada.

What troubles me about these parties and their rise is not that. It is the way in which they are expanding the reach of the most pernicious elements of the Anglo American culture war. Many of these newly ascendant parties on the right, and new parties trying to represent the Old Growth Left, like George Galloway’s Workers’ Party of Britain and Sahra Wagenknecht’s Reason and Justice Alliance of Germany, share a feature uncommon in European political parties, even highly conservatives ones, just a few years ago.

They take pseudoscientific positions on the climate crisis. I do not merely mean that they pursue policies that will increase carbon emissions. Parties across the political spectrum do that, with various justifications or, increasingly frequently, none at all. Indeed, as British Columbia and Germany have recently shown, Social Democratic-Green coalition governments can be the most effective at building pipelines, burning coal and fracking gas. Conservative parties wish they could match the kinds of alliances Greens and Social Democrats can make with Big Oil, like the $6 billion in new subsidies the NDP and Greens handed companies like Petronas and Royal Dutch Shell. As I have written before, nothing raises investment capital for a new pipeline better than a photo of Greta Thunberg posing with the leader of the jurisdiction in which it is to be built.

The battle between the British Conservative Party and Nigel Farage’s Reform Party (that guy has staged more political comebacks that I have ever attempted!) is a microcosm of the upsetting spread of the Anglo American culture war through the whole of the Global North, reshaping the First World’s epistemology and experience of community.

In the 1980s, political parties of all stripes accepted the Greenhouse Effect as part of a long-term scientific consensus and pledged to take decisive action to address it. The political debate was about which parties’ plans for dealing with the climate made the most sense and were most cost-feasible. But in the 1990s, that shifted. With the defeat of the regimes of Brian Mulroney and George H W Bush, a new kind of conservative climate politics came to the fore: leaders like Stockwell Day, Stephen Harper, Newt Gingrich and Ralph Klein did not deny that the Greenhouse Effect was real. They simply maintained that it wasn’t that big a deal and, besides, there was no point in doing anything because India’s and China’s economies were expanding and would increase emissions anyway, and besides, it would be way too costly to actually do anything effective anyway. I characterize this position as “climate nihilism.”

But in Europe, conservative parties remained in the state of 1980s American conservatism until recently, with leaders like Angela Merkel and Rishi Sunak still slinging the climate politics of a Mulroney. Farage eclipsing Sunak would constitute British conservatism leaping directly from climate action to full-on denialism, skipping a whole generation of nihilism.

The Rise of the Denialists
With the rise of Trump, climate nihilism was deposed as the normative position of the right. Climate denialism took its place. As I have discussed in other essays, I continue to use the term “denialism,” despite its pejorative connotations because it is descriptive of a particular way of structuring belief. Climate denialists have no shared or stable position on how the climate does work, only on how it does not.

As I have stated in other essays, climate denialists comprise four main intellectual tendencies:

individuals who believe that humans cannot, by definition, change the climate; some base this belief on a view that only God can change the earth’s climate; others base their belief on the idea that the earth is very very big and we are very very small;
individuals who believe that carbon atoms in the atmosphere do not have a highly efficient insulating effect but instead that they either (i) are incapable of producing an insulating effect at their current density, (ii) are incapable of producing an insulating effect at any density, (iii) are reflecting so much heat away from the earth that they are actually cooling it;
individuals who follow the new thinking of Patrick Moore that atmospheric carbon atoms do rapidly warm the planet and that we must increase global temperatures by ten degrees Celsius as quickly as possible because (i) we must do so to ward off an impending ice age (ii) the planet must be helped to reach its full life-supporting potential, which can only be realized under Eocene hothouse conditions;
individuals who believe that the inherent inaccuracy of long-term climate forecasting models for a chaotic, complex system like the atmosphere discredits the underlying science of the effects of atmospheric carbon and has demonstrated that there cannot be a Greenhouse Effect

I say “tendencies” rather than camps or groups because climate denialists will switch between these positions multiple times, often in a single conversation. When they do this together, they tend to feel affirmed and agreed-with, even if the person they are talking to is directly contradicting a claim they have just made. This is even more maddening when one is arguing with a denialist and they switch among these positions in the course of a single conversation.

So, the spread of climate denialism from the original Anglo white settler states, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US across the Atlantic, to the UK and onto the continent is a concern, not just when it comes to public discourse but because of the function denialism performs.

In other essays, I have written about how climate denialism does have clear pro-social functions, like the way it seems to reduce the celebration of child endangerment and abuse. But I want to suggest that its primary function is one of boundary maintenance, of community construction. Because climate denialism is not a stable set of ideas, an ideology or an alternative scientific theory, it is not persuasive, from a logical perspective. You cannot become convinced of denialism in the way you become convinced of an idea.

I have watched a number of people become climate denialists, people I respected and continue to respect. These people have a common story: they, like me, were progressives. They, like me, were canceled. They, like me, found a new and welcoming community on the anti-authoritarian populist right.

They, in other words, were people who had been traumatically rejected by long-term friends and communities in which they had felt safe, and were followed to their new community by feelings of profound unsafety. So, when they saw that contemporary Anglo-American conservatives use climate denial as a form of community boundary maintenance and identification, they were strongly motivated the make their position on the right secure.

Their motivation was, of course, conditioned not by how conservatives handle pluralism but how progressives have come to handle it. I work with conservatives all the time. Perhaps because they are constantly being inundated with refugees from the left, conservatives have developed a more pluralistic social contract. I can be their friend and comrade without being a conservative. My opinions on climate are not a firing offense, when it comes to our shared projects and relationships. But they do mark me as a non-conservative, a member of an ideological minority group temporarily sheltering in conservative society.

A key reason my friends and comrades have been so willing to adopt climate denial is their experience in progressive society. You see: over the past decade, just as conservatives have made the pseudoscience of climate denial their primary boundary maintenance condition, progressives have made their own pseudoscience, genderwang, theirs.

Like climate denialism, genderwang is a denialist community. It doesn’t deny the Greenhouse Effect. It denies something even bigger and more obvious: the existence of biological sex in the human species. And it, too, encompasses a set of mutually contradictory intellectual tendencies:

sex is assigned at birth by authoritarian genocidal medical personnel, not observed; there is no difference between male and female bodies other than the physically undetectable, immutable pre-existent sexed soul inside them; there are female penises and male vaginas; there is no way, from simply looking at a body, to know its sex; sex and gender are the same thing and people know their true sex, in their mind even in the womb and knowing it is their first conscious thought; people with vaginas lose races to people with penises because they are lazy, don’t try hard enough and are deliberately losing to make trans people look bad;
the invisible, undetectable, immutable, pre-existent soul inside people has a gender; a person’s gender can differ from their biological sex; in fact, with increasing frequency, the pre-existent gendered souls are born in the wrong-sex body; we must medically intervene to correct this birth defect by performing “gender-affirming” surgeries to make these bodies’ sex align with their gender; sex and gender are completely different things and people know their true immutable, pre-existent gender, in their mind, even in the womb, and knowing it is their first conscious thought;
we are all on a “gender journey” and our biological sex may change, sometimes multiple times, throughout our lives; thanks to new technologies, we can keep swapping out body parts and sex characteristics like Mister Potato Head, with absolutely no medical or psychiatric consequences; the only medical risk is not following a soul on its gender journey; sex and gender are sometimes the same thing and sometimes not, depending on what needs to happen next; and people’s knowledge of what their sex is shifts with their sex, itself, sometimes within a few hours.

As with climate denialists, sex denialists will only see these mutually contradictory ideas reinforcing each other. Like climate denialists, they might take all of these positions in the course of a single conversation or argument. But the consequences of noticing these contradictions are much more severe. They can lead to the loss of the custody of one’s children, loss of employment, loss of friendships and relationships, expulsion from churches and civil society groups and, in an increasing number of countries, incarceration.

As I suggested in my piece on the Donatist Crisis, the best community boundary maintenance is done with word salad, not sense, with pseudoscience and magical belief, not ideas or knowledge. Espousing belief in nonsense, in magic, in word salad can only measure one thing: allegiance to the community that shares this putative belief. The problem with making membership in a community contingent on a scientific belief or consistent ideology is the danger that someone espousing the belief is not a loyal member of the community because they might have simply been convinced of its veracity. Only magical belief and pseudoscience represent membership and loyalty, alone.

Straw Men and Only Straw Men
Another way one can detect that we are dealing with communities of magical belief is their tendency to never present the argument of their opponents but to always outrageously strawman it. There are lots of polarizing debates in which the adversaries clearly understand and accurately represent their opponents’ arguments.

Gun control comes readily to mind. Advocates for gun control focus their arguments on breaking down the idea that an armed populace is more effective at resisting tyranny. Gun control opponents focus their arguments on how little about the gun market law enforcement is capable of controlling, when the culture is hostile to that control. Looking back at the debate, it seems pretty respectful and responsible. People hear each other’s points and disagree.

Compare the popular gun control memes and claims of the Sex Denialist and Climate Denialist movements. They almost all entail presenting outrageous falsehoods about the beliefs of those outside the community, falsehoods easily debunked if there were any good faith direct interaction going on.

Common Climate Denialist claims include:

opponents believe every sovereign country has its own climate and atmosphere and any emission increases or reductions directly and immediately affect those in the country in which an emission originated’;
opponents claim that everywhere in the world is always hotter than it was the year before, that “average global temperature” means “local temperature everywhere”;
opponents all wish to end farming and switch to a diet of veganism and insects;
there was a scientific consensus in which opponents believed in the 70s and 80s, predicting an imminent global ice age;
opponents never believed in the destabilizing polar vortex or any other climate phenomenon that increases the number of unpredictable, unseasonable cold weather events, are completely taken by surprise by these events and are unable to explain them;
opponents believe that the climate has never changed before and have never heard of the Medieval Warm Period, Little Ice Age or Darkening of the Sun and cannot explain these things;
opponents believe that their individual lifestyle changes to reduce carbon emissions will cause their personal lives to be less afflicted by warming and extreme weather events; and
opponents believe that carbon dioxide and methane are the only things in the atmosphere that affect climate.

Common Sex Denialist claims include:

opponents advocate that everyone’s genitals be inspected before they are permitted to enter a washroom;
opponents oppose people of both sexes using single-occupant washrooms;
opponents demand that children and adults conform to stereotypical roles based on their birth sex;
opponents want to hurt gender-confused children, either by driving them to suicide, brainwashing or violently assaulting them;
no homosexuals oppose sex denialism;
opponents hate homosexuals and want them to be subject to mass violence and assault;
opponents are completely focused on the genitals of trans-identified people because nothing other than their genitals distinguishes them from the sex class they are trying to identify into;
opponents are all social conservatives and motivated by religious intolerance;
opponents are led by a Scottish children’s book author and do not form their own opinions, instead fanatically following her diktats; and
no opponent genuinely cares about prison rape, women’s sports, rape shelters, child safeguarding or the health of gay and autistic youth; people adversely impacted by genderwang policies do not exist, deserve whatever happens to them if they do exist (because they are only claiming to be hurt because they are bigots), and are not and should not be genuinely cared-about by anyone else.

Not only are these claims all false; many actually describe the positions taken by sex denialists themselves, situationally, when engaged in making demands or claims that serve them.

The Crisis of the West
Shortly after I got to Tanzania, I was giving some business advice to local businessmen about getting investors for a ship-cleaning service at the Port of Dar Es Salaam. The meeting began, like a fair number of my discussions with middle class residents of Dar this year, with a conversation about the unseasonable extreme weather events the city was suffering and how the Greenhouse Effect was to blame. Later in the meeting, they asked me about how to spin their efforts to mitigate the climate impact of the disposal business to foreign investors. I asked if they knew what political parties their potential investors belonged to. The question seemed bizarre to them.

I then had to explain that, whereas, in most of the world, the Greenhouse Effect is a scientific fact for which evidence mounds up every day in the form of record temperatures and extreme weather events, it is a cultural belief in Anglo America, that if the investors were supporters of the Republican Party, for instance, any mention of climate change would drive away their investment.

And, returning to the European elections, what disturbs me is that belief in both biological sex and climate change, are being converted into cultural beliefs throughout the Global North, that, as we saw with the reception of the Cass Review in England, no amount of corroborated, factual information can cause people inside the “culture war” to change their opinion about very physically obvious things. As the contagion spreads, our societies are reflecting the United States, a country where the two main socio-political factions, the communities in which most people have to live, are structured, bounded, based on belief in pseudoscience, in magic.

The “most advanced” countries in the world are fast becoming the most superstitious. One is reminded of the late Qing Dynasty destruction of maps, that as China got smaller and less powerful, elites acted to destroy as evidence of the diminution, of the decline, by attacking the maps showing it.

The Enlightenment legacy of the West is clearly failing in its core, traditional territory. But if there is one reassuring thing that has been reinforced for me as I have met with people working on climate from Kenya, South Sudan, Egypt, Turkey, Tanzania, Ecuador, Peru and other places, it is that not every culture has abandoned these ideals. The world over, people still aspire to the ideals of scientific truth, human rights, democracy, and they are bewildered that people in the traditional territory of the West have abandoned them. But that is actually the story of the West. It has always been on the move. It is not a place or a people; it does not live in the blood but in the human soul.

Authoritarianism Canadian Politics Politics of Epistemology Politics of Identity US Politics | fusangite | June 21, 2024

The Anti-Cosmopolitan City (part 2): The Intolerant Urbanizer

Real Problems and Crises in Rural and Northern Canada
Wally Oppal is probably one of the most accomplished people every to have served in elected office in BC history. He served, from 2005 to 2009, as Gordon Campbell’s Attorney-General, Minister of Justice and Minister of State for Multiculturalism. He was part of the one four-year stretch of benign technocratic liberalism the BC Liberal Party managed to deliver during the second quarter of its sixteen years in power.

He was part of the government that unexpectedly introduced English Canada’s first carbon tax, one that course corrected to the political centre, after four years of slash and burn neoliberal austerity and privatization. Having already made a name for himself as a Supreme Court and Appeal Court justice, following his electoral defeat in 2009, Oppal was deemed that ideal person to chair a government commission into one of the worst episodes of police failure and dereliction of duty, the 2010 Missing Women Commission of Inquiry into the multi-year reign of murderous predation serial killer Robert Pickton inflicted on the survival sex workers of Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside (DTES).

The does not stand alone. It is one of a half-dozen reports by different levels of settler and indigenous governments and international NGOs that investigated the larger phenomenon of missing and murdered indigenous women in Canada, including but not limited to Northwestern BC’s infamous Highway of Tears and Southwestern BC’s infamous DTES.

But while the report does not stand alone, it does stand out as the best of such reports. Like all others it has two main demands: (1) restore the bus and (2) close the camps.

If you want female members of the rural underclass to be abducted, raped and murdered less, they should probably have an affordable way to get from the Indian Reserve (i.e. brutally underserviced rural ghetto) to town for groceries, smokes, a movie, a trip to the pub. So, allowing the bus service to be withdrawn and then restoring only a fraction of it, with there being no bus service on most days and no on-reserve stops on most reserves is probably not a great thing. If only we could get the bus service back to 1997 levels!

The other demand, to close the camps, is equally obvious. Rural and Northern Canada is being emptied of towns and villages which are being replaced with temporary worker camps, known colloquially as “man camps.” Reversing Cold War policies that sought to settle workers in the industrial periphery in towns and villages with schools, hospitals and public amenities, neoliberal and post-neoliberal policies have sought to dismantle small towns and replace them with temporary encampments, single industry towns composed almost entirely of young men, without basic amenities, government services or an environment in which children could be raised.

Gone are the mining towns of the past with their community halls, small elementary schools and newspaper offices. Gone even are the restaurants and cafes as camp workers eat in enormous mess halls when not suppressing their appetites with central nervous system stimulants whose use is widely tolerated in the camps.

Because these camps are so dominated by energy sector workers, usually existing to construct pipelines, frack natural gas or build macro-hydro projects, enterprising academics in the US have found they can construct predictive murder maps just by knowing fracking and pipeline construction locations. The isolated, young, stimulant-using young men typically work two weeks in, two weeks out, spending the rest of their time in communities like Fort Mac and Fort St. John. To briefly reference an earlier article, this is why I tend to call the communities Rex Murphy idealized “Jeckyllvilles.”

Oppal’s Underappreciated Insights Into Self-Fashioning
But Oppal went beyond the usual “close the camps,” “bring back the bus” chorus to write in detail about how women and girls’ at-risk status follows them from low income rural communities in ways that have little to do with race. Oppal observed that the non-indigenous women targeted by Pickton and other predators shared key demographic characteristics: they were low-income and had migrated to the Vancouver as young adults.

Oppal argued that, for young, low-income migrants, urbanization is a crucial part of identity formation and self-fashioning, that becoming a fully agentive person with her own distinct identity and choices is strongly conflated with moving to the city for young women who find themselves in at-risk work, at-risk housing or in conflict with the law. To return to a rural community or even request help from people still residing in it is a shameful act for young adults who centre urbanization in the creation of their adult self.

In other words, the use of urbanization narratives in self-fashioning, in and of itself, places young women from the rural and remote communities at material risk by constraining their access to material and the range of places they can live. Not only is it shameful to return to one’s supposedly benighted community of origin or obtain aid from its residents; it is shameful to admit that one has experienced, violence, intolerance of exploitation in one’s new place of residence. It creates incentives for narrating painful, dangerous and exploitive work as more voluntary and less harmful than it actually is.

And this kind of thinking is hardly limited to survival sex workers and members of the urban underclass.

When one examines those most enthusiastic about stripping urban life of ideological pluralism, religious diversity, etc. we tend to see urbanizers disproportionately represented among the most intolerant. They tend to espouse the belief that the kind of community they left was not merely situationally problematic at the time that they but that rural communities are inherently benighted and that the kind of people who voluntarily live in such places are, axiomatically, people who are some mixture of ignorant, evil and stupid.

I am not, of course, referring to all people who move from small communities to large communities. I am referring to a particular subset in which the intolerance is most concentrated, although hardly universal.

Profiling the Intolerant Urbanizer
Most people who move to larger communities do so to take up a new job or attend an educational institution. These individuals typically do not centre their urbanization the same way when fashioning an identity and a life story. Those who move for college typically place their education at the centre of the adult identity they create; similarly, those who move for work typically place their new job at the centre of their self-fashioning project. It tends to be individuals who move and then find work or take up low-status employment prior to moving so as to finance the move.

Similarly, individuals who aspire to live in a particular city about which they developed an interest as a younger person and who move to a far-away city rather than the nearest major centre, are less likely to become intolerant urbanizers because their narrative is centred on attraction to a specific urban space, not their rejection of life in a small community. Intolerant urbanizers therefore tend to have come from lower-income backgrounds with fewer educational prospects and to lead adult lives with lower-education, lower-status jobs. Paradoxically, they often tend to accord greater respect to white collar work and higher education than those with more education and higher status jobs.

Because of this, they tend to see qualities in themselves that they value such as having high status friends and associates, being well-read and politically well-informed as arising primarily from their decision to live in a city. Consequently, they also tend to strongly associate rural communities with intolerance, ignorance, dead-end jobs, etc.

And because their decision to relocate is so central to their identity, it must always be viewed as an unalloyed and permanent good. For this reason, they are often hostile to positive news about rural and remote communities. An increasingly diverse and high quality culinary scene, the opening of a local university, these things annoy them but the news from home that intolerant urbanizers are typically most upset by is the election of non-conservatives by their former community. If their former community is expressing the same political views as the one in which they live now, its status as a benighted and unimprovable place that could never have been reformed, only escaped-from is compromised.

This is why “guns and religion,” “basket of deplorables” and “unacceptable views” discourse and quips by progressive politicians are so tempting to pepper a stump speech or interview with. They play so strongly to the intolerant urbanizers in the room whose self-fashioning narrative is premised this image of people from small communities as almost ontologically distinct from urbanites.

Obviously, there is considerable irony to this reality, given that intolerant urbanizers are leading the charge to make cities into the very sort of place they indict the countryside for being: rigid, unchanging, intolerant, pious and homogeneous.

While there have been intolerant urbanizers for as long as there have been cities, the authoritarian turn our society is taking amplifies their social power and encourages the ugliest, most problematic aspects of their worldview. Insecurity over this obvious irony, unfortunately, only magnifies the authoritarian impulse. Criticism of the widening gap between the ideal of the permissive, diverse, cosmopolitan city and the day-to-day reality of our increasingly authoritarian urban culture only increases the impetus for shunning, silencing and punishment of critics, a tightening of the circle and a further chilling of speech.

It is really the height of irony that the highest priority when it comes to controlled and coerced speech is the demand for a chorus of agreement about just how free, diverse and tolerant city life really is. From preschool onwards, educators, news media and opinion leaders relentlessly “celebrate” just how wonderfully tolerant the contemporary progressive city is. But those most committed to these celebrations are those raised outside of the cities, who have made changing their residential address in their teens or twenties the most important thing about themselves in the fragile identity that sits atop this migration story.

Self-made identities and self-fashioning projects are not equally important or present in all human societies. The intolerant urbanizer is part of a larger phenomenon about which I have written in the past: our society’s reversion to a baroque culture, one deeply concerned with social rank, one that transacts an increasing portion of social power through dynamics of honour and offense. Such societies tend to encourage and foreground forms of self-presentation as central to identity dynamics and the intolerant urbanizer is just one element, just one example of how these new social trends are curdling urban life in the Global North.

Authoritarianism BC Politics Canadian Politics Landscape, Urban and Spatial Studies Politics of Identity US Politics | fusangite | May 20, 2024

The Anti-Cosmopolitan City – Part #1: the Tolerance Horseshoe

The Tea Party and Trump Waves
I was living with an American woman, the daughter of evangelical Christians and major Republican donors. They had a framed wall-length signed portrait of George W Bush in their entry foyer and had FoxNews, which Rachel termed “the Jonestown loudspeaker of conservative America” running on the television in at least one room at all times. I moved to the US with my beloved in 2010 and continued residing in the US, even after we split up, through 2012. I celebrated Thanksgiving in 2010 at the home of a Tea Party organizer in Fort Worth, Texas. I was living in Kansas City when Rick Santorum won the Missouri GOP primary in 2012. And, from 2002 to 2022, I was part of a community of tabletop role playing gamers centred in Raleigh, North Carolina, one of the locations the America’s conservative and liberal tectonic plates collide.

So I want to make clear that I experienced the dark turn of American conservatism up close and personal, from the Sarah Palin nomination through Charlottesville. And there is no doubt that less dense, less urban, more rural and smaller communities led America’s descent into the various forms of intolerance and woolly thinking that blossomed in those years. Palin’s “real America” was more easily duped by conspiracy theories, more likely to blame outsiders for problems, more inclined to political hyperbole and polarization and grew more suspicious of the rest of America, leavened by all that Koch Brothers money.

But the Tea Party and Trump waves were not especially remarkable. Political scientists and historians expect reactionary movements to come from smaller, more rural, more remote communities, to be concentrated in economic sectors that appear to be in their sunset years. Scholars expect those with less education, residing in less demographically diverse communities to be more prone to nativism, xenophobia and “us versus them” thinking.

What is far more shocking, far more in need of explaining and far more pressing an issue is the way in which it has become the most educated, the most urban, the most progressive who now lead Anglo America’s charge against political pluralism, free speech, scientific literacy, religious tolerance, press freedom and representative democracy.

While history is full of intolerant cities and welcoming, pluralistic small towns, historical moments when rural areas are more culturally and politically pluralistic than urban areas in the same society are rare. Times are rare when educated people are more ideologically inflexible and hostile to new information than those with less formal education. If people are going to be beaten in the street for their unorthodox views, if books are going to be banned, if the places of worship of minority peoples are going to be burned, we expect small towns to commit those sins prior to and more prolifically than the big cities, not the reverse.

Yet, as of about half a decade ago, this is the reality into which Anglo America and much of the rest of the Global North has entered.

The Crisis of Intolerance in Our Cities
When Meghan Murphy, the gender critical feminist journalist, was driven out of her home town of Vancouver, a key moment was the day she left her house in the morning to discover her photo plastered on lamp standards around her neighbourhood, calling her a hate criminal and suggesting that violence against her was appropriate.

During her nearly successful bid for mayor of Ottawa, Catherine McKenney (they/them), then a city councillor, organized a public beating of “Billboard” Chris Elston, the children’s rights campaigner and following his public flogging, threatened a more severe beating should he attempt to return to Ottawa with his “children can’t consent to puberty blockers” campaign.

When the hundredth church arson attacking non-white Christians took place in Regina last month, directed against a Catholic congregation primarily comprising three racial groups, Africans, Middle Easterners and Filipinos, a Conservative motion condemning the burning was shouted down in parliament by members of the overwhelmingly urban caucuses of the Liberal and New Democratic Parties. And when David Eby, NDP premier of BC was approached through back-channels by those seeking stronger law enforcement around church burnings (perpetrators have only been charged in 2% of cases), Eby reacted by announcing new measures, not to prevent hate crimes against racialized Christians, but to criminalize the beliefs of the parishioners.

When the Million March for Children took place last fall and thousands of Canadians turned out to oppose government programs to chemically lobotomize and sterilize children without parental knowledge or consent, rallies were able to take place in rural communities but in urban centres, “counter protesters” did everything in their power not merely to stage their own protests but to drown out or disperse rally participants. Murphy, during one of her brief trips to Canada was charged by counter-protesters attempting to physically assault her. They failed to hit her but still managed to prevent the rally coming off and her from speaking. My comrade Lierre Keith, head of the Women’s Liberation Front, was not so lucky. She was punched in the face at two rallies in the Pacific Northwest while attempting to speak that year.

And as we saw in rallies from Melbourne to Dublin to Vancouver to San Francisco, it is not merely that the police failed to hold back violence against the protesters. Police officers were often shown assisting violent mobs in carrying out their beatings, in some cases being caught on film pointing and laughing as vigilante mobs beat unarmed protesters with fists and weapons.

And this goes beyond organized politics. Vehicular collisions are up. Pedestrian deaths at the hands of drivers are up. Stranger assaults are up. Exhibitionism and other contactless sex crimes are up.

Ancient Alexandria and the Urban Scale Horseshoe
I have long expressed outrage at the dark turn my city and so many others have been taking but it is long past time to go beyond that outrage, that we began thinking about both the short- and long-term factors that are giving rise to this curdling of the cosmopolitan city because there is no single force, no single explanation that can adequately or fully account for what is happening. A confluence of factors has made the increasing intolerance of our cities self-magnifying, as those fearing persecution and intolerance move to smaller, more human scale communities or out of the Global North altogether.

As a historian, the first place I naturally go when seeking to answer such a question is the past: when, in the past, has it been the cities that have led their rural counterparts when it came to intolerance?

The pogroms against the Jews of Alexandria in 38 CE under governor Flaccus are a striking example and one of the few times in Antiquity that urban Jews fared worse than rural Jews at the hands of pagans or, later, Christians. On the occasions that urban communities outdistanced the hinterland in their persecution of Jews and other minorities, up to Germany in the 1930s and 40s, there may be some patterns.

The cities in which pogroms were most enthusiastic and popular (as opposed to being driven from above) tended to have a geography segregated primarily by religion rather than by class. While all cities have tended to experience natural religious ghettoization, this has been tempered by countervailing and competing forces, like occupational and class-based segregation of “unclean” work and workers. The multi-confessional character of industries like butchering, tanning, fishing and logistics produced kinds of residential congregation and segregation that could undercut religious uniformity in an area.

There is also the question of scale. Alexandria was one of the few pre-modern cities with a population that exceeded a million. This scale permitted something highly problematic that Philo of Alexandria, the great Jewish intellectual, who leaves us the best written records of the 38 CE pogroms, which he survived, called out in his time.

Philo was concerned that many of his neighbours and coreligionists in Alexandria were falling away from the Jewish sumptuary laws, not keeping kosher, not honouring the Sabbath, etc. This was because, he observed, unlike a Jew in a smaller city, an Alexandrian Jew could experience his identity as a Jew just by rising in the morning and heading out the door. Everyone he would meet that day, everyone with whom he socialized, everyone with whom he worked, everyone from whom he bought something would be a Jew. In this way, living at such a massive demographic scale actually replicated the life of a Jew in tiny village off the Jordan River.

There was no need to maintain behavioural boundaries or to be behaviourally distinct; geography and economy took care of all that for you. And if that was happening to Jews, it was most certainly happening to the pagan majority which held political power in the city, backed by an imperial army and navy drawn from a military hegemon with forty million residents.

I want to suggest that one of the most pernicious elements of Diversity, Equity and Inclusion, “Queer”/Pharma Pride, the rise of social media “call-out” culture and various other forms of cultural authoritarianism is the way in which they help to recreate Philo’s Alexandria. Even if people in a workplace have diverse opinions and affiliations politically, they are increasingly required to express identical views in their workplace for fear of losing employment. Progressive urbanites on Facebook routinely see threats from friends and family on their screen, telling them what virtuous political position they must now express in order to be spared public humiliation and ostracism.

In smaller, more human scale communities, complete segregation from those who disagree with you is less feasible. Ideologically recalcitrant people cannot be wholly purged from or cowed within the labour system. The break room in a company in a smaller town is more likely to contain people who express unorthodox political views.

In other words, there is a kind of horseshoe effect when it comes to community size: make a city large enough and it can segregate its way to small-town religious and ideological parochialism, provided there exists a strong enough “us-them” dynamic and an enforcement system with the muscle to back it up.

Purity and Pollution in the Modern City
Key to such an “us-them” dynamics are ideas of purity and pollution. As I have been arguing the past two years, I believe that the class differences between the rural and industrial proletariat and the rest of the population have been magnified to the point where they exhibit the qualities of caste.

I have made my cultural arguments concerning race, economic sector, public health policy and a host of others concerning the amplification of cultural difference and the need to segregate “unclean” persons from the rest of us. Pseudoscientific myths concerning Covid vaccination and transmission, the re-description of unorthodox speech as “unsafe” the repackaging of anti-Métis racism as “anti-racism” and the growing state-sponsored conspiracy industry that labels me a hate criminal and Diagolon a white supremacist terrorist paramilitary have helped to give rise to moments like the East Vancouver anti-Truckism (Terry Glavin’s term, not my own) protest of 2022.

A solidarity convoy was organized in the dying days of the Ottawa convoy to show support for the increasingly nutty remnant of the protest in Ottawa and arrived in Vancouver but the people of East Vancouver were ready with a counter-protest. I asked a friend who supported the counter-protest what they were counter-protesting, given that the convoyists had basically stopped issuing coherent demand. Which of the trucker demands, I asked, were people protesting.

The answer was horrifyingly honest: people were not turning out to protest a political position the truckers were taking. They were protesting their existence as human beings, the fact that they were people who existed and wore the wrong clothes, worked at the wrong jobs, enjoyed the wrong recreational activities and lived in the wrong places. As Glavin had cleverly pointed out with a nonsense neologism, there was no “truckism” to protest.

That is why, when the two groups of protesters finally clashed at First Avenue and Commercial Drive, the truckers, forced to a standstill by the protesters honked their horns and waved their Canadian flags and the counter-protesters chanted “trans rights are human rights!” again and again.

But another way to examine this caste-making is to look at the function of caste within a market economy. Caste had made the Indian economy the most dynamic and productive in the world and, its spread to Europe and the New World, through the creation of “black” and “Indian” (the American kind) as heritable castes, is inextricable from the sustained growth and dynamism we associate with mercantilism and capitalism in the early modern world.

One of the reasons caste makes a market economy more effective is by reserving certain kinds of work for certain castes and constraining the labour supply for that work by rendering certain castes ineligible for it. Truckists cannot simply enter the commissar class simply by obtaining the right training and professional credentials. They must also at least appear to embrace the American space religion the commissars practice, with its veneration of self-harm, special grammar and usage rules, numerous novel holidays, special flags and costume, and complex system of etiquette.

An increasing number of professional degree programs now require the taking of loyalty oaths to the ideology of the commissars as do many workplaces. More difficult to fake than a loyalty oath are official records of regular Covid mRNA vaccinations. And, given the highly urban character of most commissar class jobs, aside from frontline elementary education, there is the matter of urbanization.

It deserves a whole article.

Authoritarianism Canadian Politics Landscape, Urban and Spatial Studies Politics of Identity | fusangite | May 14, 2024

Why Do We Think Doing Crack in the Hospital Is Okay?

Anxiety in the Age of Trump
Whether or not one was a Donald Trump supporter, the end of the primaries in the summer of 2016 inaugurated a new age of vigilance, anxiety and outrage for Americans. Whether by virtue of Trump’s boorish norm violations, intentionally provocative communications strategy and general emotional dysregulation, or whether due to the near-constant attacks on the Administration’s functioning and legitimacy, a new baseline level of rage and fear took hold in Anglo America and much of the Global North, a pervasive psychosocial state we have yet to shake-off eight years later.

America’s stand-up comics were, for the most part of group of liberals already skilled in mocking and belittling America’s populist conservative movements. And many did a great job of skewering the Trump administration over the president’s apparently unhinged public behaviour and revolving door of officials, each greasier and more bizarre than those they replaced.

But the comedian who best expressed the sense of anxiety that pervaded America was John Mulaney. He offered the following metaphor: “It’s like there’s a horse loose in the hospital… And nobody knows what the horse is going to do next, least of all the horse. It’s never been in a hospital before.”

I quoted that bit many times during Trump’s four years in office and have a few times since, especially as that feeling of anxiety has not gone away, what with the Bumpkin Putsch, followed by the failed impeachment, the prosecutions, the efforts to disqualify Trump based on a crime the impeachment trial had acquitted him of. The feeling that there is a horse loose in a hospital has never gone away.

But the reason this description of the situation plays so well with people like me who were steeped in progressive culture is that it plays to an unconscious belief that society, as a whole, is just one gigantic hospital.

The Rise and Fall of the Giant Agora
At the zenith of neoliberalism in the late 1990s, no matter what party one supported at election time, no matter what church one attended, no matter where one was located, socially, when neoliberalism enjoyed cultural and ideological hegemony, we saw society as a gigantic marketplace. The agora had swallowed the whole city. The schools, the hospitals, the council chambers, everything existed in the context of the marketplace. If we wanted to say that something was good, we looked around for words of praise and said things like “profit,” “efficiency,” “competition,” etc.

But as we entered a period of socio-political realignment in the early 2010s and the commissar class who dominate the Pharma and Data sectors began to eclipse the neoliberals as our cultural hegemons, our understanding of the world began to shift away from seeing everything through the prism of the market. Covid and the opioid crisis helped in this shift but the re-categorization of all pain and unpleasantness as “trauma,” and all responses to it as “triggering,” was just as important.

What had begun in the 1990s with the huge-scale prescription of third-generation SSRI anti-depressants reached its culmination as we came to redefine feeling bad as inherently problematic. Our identities began to shift, too. Those who have embraced the new progressive culture of the commissar class, have come to engage in self-fashioning behaviours of self-diagnosing oneself into a series of pathologies, with the assistance of the ubiquitous online psychiatric diagnostic quizzes, funded by a pharmaceutical industry eager to receive more orders for psychiatric drugs.

In British Columbia, the government’s policies of steadily reducing and restricting citizens’ access to free medical care have resulted in the normalization of psychiatric self-diagnosis, presented by telephone during ten-minute appointment telephone windows at clinics that charge cold hard cash to see a physician in person. More and more British Columbians are on speed as internet ADHD self-tests have come to be accepted by the province’s overloaded clinics and Adderall and other amphetamine prescriptions are dispense by phone and online. One doesn’t need to tell the government one is an addict to be prescribed meth substitutes, although that works too; one can just say that it’s tough to concentrate, what with a horse being loose in the hospital.

But it is not just during a doctor’s appointment that your average progressive British Columbian announces a set of psychiatric self-diagnoses. This is how people who have adopted the culture of the commissar class talk about themselves all the time; within a few minutes of meeting someone at a fashionable party, one begins to hear one’s new acquaintances list of mental illnesses, even before they get to their preferred pronouns.

Indeed, psychiatric self-diagnosis has become the linchpin of self-fashioning in the progressive world. As being unique and special in the sight of God is not a culturally or emotionally available option, the language one uses for both describing one’s uniqueness and begs not to be bullied in this, one of the most judgemental and predatory social orders of recent times, is to “identify into” a series of neurological disabilities and sexual fetishes.

The term “neurodiverse,” one that initially made sense only at the population level, has become conflated with “neurodivergent” and applied at the individual. If one can no longer be unique in the sight of God, one can at least be unique and special in the sight of an imaginary all-seeing doctor.

That is because what Mulaney was telling us is that we have stopped believing that society is a gargantuan, all-encompassing marketplace and has become one huge world-containing hospital.

However rational, well-intentioned and even life-saving Covid policies were, when the state began to regulate the size of the crowd you could meet for drinks, have over for dinner, even host at a backyard barbecue, a consequence was that the hospital made your home one of its rooms, your street one of its wards. The reason we have re-described ourselves as a bag of diseases and other conditions necessitating medical intervention is that we have accepted the logic of the commissars, that society is now an all-encompassing hospital.

Brad West and Doing Crack in the Hospital
It is in this context that we must approach Port Coquitlam mayor Brad West’s recent interview with the Vancouver Sun’s Vaughn Palmer. In response to the BC government announcing a review of its new policy of letting hospital patients carry weapons and buy, use and sell illicit drugs while in hospital, West suggested that the government could save its money. His review was done, “In a hospital, there’s no weapons and you can’t smoke crack or fentanyl or any other drugs. There you go. Just saved God knows how much money and probably at least six months of dithering.”

What baffled those outside the Progressiverse was how this could even be a thing, how it was that, in an environment where powerful drugs are being administered by highly trained professionals, trained in predicting and managing drug interactions, how addicts shooting up street drugs of unknown provenance or purity could possibly be remotely safe and not undermine the precise care they are receiving. How on earth did we get here? How could one reasonably administer opiate pain relievers when patients were also self-administering unknown types and quantities of opiates?

And weapons!? How could it be safe for people doing central nervous system stimulants and undergoing intensive, painful and disorienting medical treatment to be armed with hunting knives and boxcutters?

The answer is simple: if society is a hospital then the hospital is society.

And in the giant society-spanning hospital, everyone is a doctor or a patient, and as evinced in the increasingly ubiquitous signage about not upsetting and “triggering” receptionists and medical personnel at clinics, both.

If everywhere you go is the hospital, then whatever you are free to do in the world, you are, axiomatically, free to do in the hospital because if the world is the hospital then the hospital is the world.

Generally, when a society idealizes something, whoever or whatever is being idealized is actually being singled-out for special punishment. No society idealizes female virtue like Saudi Arabia or Iran. Similarly, our society grows ever more shabby in its treatment of people genuinely neurologically disabled. Autistic people have been pushed out of self-advocacy organizations and the public square by people who are merely a little quirky or socially inept. Their spaces have been invaded and their silencing has enabled, as Hillary Cass’s review most recently pointed out, a mass sterilization campaign to be waged against autistic youth in the name of genderwang.

Similarly, mental healthcare has all been all but withdrawn from people truly disabled by addiction and madness. Treatment has been replaced by “supportive housing” and tent cities. It seems that the only right of the addicted and insane we defend is their right to be miserable, to sleep rough, to defecate in the streets, to shoot up in parks and to scream at passers-by. And there is a logic to this too. The more ill health there is, the more society really does seem like a gigantic understaffed hospital.

Medicalized Societies Are Sick Societies
We are not the first society to decide to see everything through the prism of medicine and disease. In recent studies of Franciscan and Jesuit catechisms written in Iroquoian languages, we find that the societies embroiled in the “mourning wars,” of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, wherein Huron and Iroquois warriors engaged in endless capture-oriented military campaigns to replace population lost to smallpox and other Eastern Hemisphere diseases also saw the world in medical terms.

Almost every positive thing Christian missionaries promised new indigenous converts was described in the Iroquoian languages, as a form of medicine. Every good thing in the universe, grace, salvation, sustenance, community was presented as “medicine.” That is because a society only decides it is a gigantic hospital if those living therein know that sicknesses of body and mind have metastasized into a social sickness, a society-wide cancer, in the case of the Iroquois, an epidemic not just of smallpox but of something they called “false face disease,” a consequence of centuries of continuous war, disease and martial law.

The way out of such a society, such a state of being is not more medicine. It is not categorizing more things as sickness and categorizing more activities as medicine. Prescribing chemical castration and lobotomization drugs to children may be called “medicine” but there is nothing healthy about it. Offering to murder disabled, homeless and depressed people through the MAID program is called “medicine” but it is anything but. Amputating people’s healthy body parts or adding prostheses and fake orifices so they can better resemble the Japanese cartoons they believe to be their “true selves” is not medicine by any reasonable definition, nor is secretly prescribing fentanyl to teenagers as part of some sort of Opposite Day “harm reduction” plan.

You see: the thing that makes our society sicker, more dangerous than the late-stage Iroquois Confederacy is that a hospital is a hierarchical, authoritarian bureaucratic institution that conflates power, expertise and medicine into a single authoritative principle. In this society, whatever the state does, is, by definition, “medicine,” irrespective of whether it makes you more or less healthy, irrespective of whether it makes you suffer, irrespective of whether it even kills you.

If there is a solution, I would suggest we can find it in the Tao Te Ching:

“He who is sick of sickness is well.”

Authoritarianism BC Politics Canadian Politics Politics of Identity US Politics | fusangite | April 25, 2024

Theorizing the Current Debate in Gender Critical Land

If you are here to read about movement strategy and theory, read the whole thing. If you’re just here for the theory, skip ahead to the section called “Social Constructions.”

The Current State of the Gender Critical Movement
For most of the past decade, the gender critical movement, for lack of a better term, i.e. opponents of genderwang from all quarters in society, have been against the ropes taking punch after punch after punch, just trying to keep our careers, homes, jobs and kids, with, at best, mixed degrees of success.

However, beginning in Red State America and England, places where there are long-term, albeit different, cultural traditions that enable dissidents and popular classes to push back against elite hegemony, we have started chalking up the odd victory. By “victory,” I don’t mean actual gains for gender critical thinking in culture and law but successful resistance to ambitious, novel changes to culture and public policy that have been forced-though elsewhere but are stalled in particular regions within the two largest and most venerable countries of the Anglosphere. And I have offered some reasons for the greater resilience of Dixie and England in my writing previously.

Perhaps it is the luxury of occasionally winning something that is allowing a coalition of people and organizations largely forced together by our adversaries that is causing us to begin squabbling more vigorously and loudly about our differences in public. We are an extraordinarily broad coalition, encompassing a range of opinion from deeply anti-feminist religious traditionalists to communist lesbian separatists.

But it is not the merits of feminism and nor of traditional partriarchal religion that forms the locus of the conflict. In some ways, our movement is showing its health because our divisions are not playing out along those lines. In fact, radical feminists and religious conservatives are likely to be on the same page whereas people who have been pulled into the debate over questions of child safeguarding or free speech are more likely to be in the opposite camp, along the small but important community around which much of the debate swirls, a group I will call “legacy transsexuals.”

So, what are the camps? First of all, the framing and naming of the issue indicates which side is winning. The camps are those who oppose using “wrong-sex pronouns” and those who believe we should award the honour of third person pronouns not matching sex to adults who underwent gender reassignment surgery but are on our side, politically, regarding pediatric gender medicine, free speech and other issues.

The Problems of Grand Coalitions
One of the reasons I feel qualified to contribute to this debate is that I have experience with working in anti-establishment grand coalitions from days as leader of the BC Green Party. In the 1990s, I played a founding and leadership role in the BC Anti-Casino Coalition and BC Electoral Change Coalition. The former group included conservative and far left municipal politicians, trade union leaders, social conservatives, people of faith from both liberal and conservative churches and was led by members of what we might call the “NIMBY Left.” The latter comprised liberal academics studying the voting system, the anti-abortion movement, the neo-Jeffersonian taxpayer movement, environmentalists and Maoists.

Unlike the current grand coalition that has been corralled and herded together by the establishment, these coalitions formed voluntarily. As such, we built institutions and processes for working together as our coalition coalesced. One of the challenges we face today is that we are in a situation more akin to the coalition building work of the United Nations powers in the Second World War. Having discovered that we are under attack by the same powers, we now have to figure out how to cooperate because we’re stuck with each other until the end of this war.

Due to the highly effective retooling and escalation of the cancelation campaign waged against me since 2020 in 2022, work I wanted to do in sharing my practical knowledge from the grand coalitions of the 1990s mostly went nowhere. I simply was not able to participate as much as I wished in the organized coalitions that haltingly emerged in 2023. All I was able to do was get my otherwise-Marxist institute to sponsor a monthly multi-partisan gender critical meet-up and bring in conservative intellectual Karin Litzcke as its co-chair.

The first thing this undignified public debate should tell us is that we need national and supra-national institutions where these things should be, if not agreed upon then, at least clarified and fought over by trusted movement leaders outside immediate public view. Twitter is a suboptimal location for us to be hanging out these questions, especially when, because we are struggling to find language to describe our disagreement, it is all the easier to descend into expressing our disagreements in interpersonal or sectarian terms.

Gender criticals need spaces to fight with each other and make necessary agreements at a high level. And I commit, if I decide return to Canada this fall, to building such spaces.

A word on such spaces before we get to the theory: the people from whom I learned the most about how to sustain unity in a coalition in which there is only agreement on one issue are now deceased and deeply missed by me: Kathleen Toth, the anti-abortion activist and leader of the Family Coalition Party of BC and Charles Boylan, the Maoist and leader of the BC Marxist-Leninist Party. There was almost nothing other than the need for proportional representation on which I agreed with either of them but I learned a lot not just about the practicalities of broad coalition work but about how to see goodness and experience friendship with people whose politics and worldview one deeply opposes.

Social Constructions
I want to suggest that, as with so many of the problems our movement faces, the origin of our difficulty is that even we internalize too many of the cognitive distortions the genderwang Newspeak project is pushing into our consciousness every minute of every day through legacy media, social media and compelled speech in our homes and workplaces.

When gender ideologues state that they believe “gender is a social construction,” we mistakenly believe them. Their argument is that their gender is whatever they personally think it is at that moment of that day, that whatever they believe in their heart of hearts about their gender is necessarily true.

Except: that is not what “social construction” means. You do not need to read Michel Foucault or Judith Butler or any other poststructuralist thinker to know that. Just look at the words. A construction is something that is made, built, fashioned in the real world, not merely fleetingly imagined in one’s private interior life. What genderists today mean by “social construction” is actually “personal fantasy.”

To give an example of a social construction, let’s pick something neutral, like time zones. Until the advent of long-distance passenger rail, time was what one might call “objectively determined.” In every place in the world, one could discover when the shortest shadows were cast in all directions and deduce that the sun was at the highest point in the sky. Whenever the sun reached its zenith, that was noon. It was then just a matter of dividing the rest of the time into twenty-four hours of equal length and dividing those hours into sixty minutes of equal length. As one moved around the circumference of the earth, what time it was was both objectively discoverable and slightly different from everywhere else.

But it was impossible to fashion railway schedules on that basis. So, strips of the world were arbitrarily selected and turned into “time zones.” And what was originally called “railway time,” soon wholly obliterated the objective experience of time human beings had been living with for millennia. Instead, all time was determined relative to when noon happened at the Greenwich Observatory east of London. Time ceased to describe one’s position relative to the sun or surface of the earth and now described which zone one had been arbitrarily placed in and the centre of that zone’s position relative to Greenwich.

We now find this so natural that we use the communications technology we now have not to measure what time it is objectively where we are but to instead make sure that everyone’s clock knows what zones it is in and reports the time in that zone identically, down to the nanosecond. This is what a social construction is, something that is based on physical and observed realities and constructed out of them based on widespread, near-unanimous social agreement. It feels like part of the physical world but as actually something we build, maintain and constantly rebuild and reinforce at the level of mass culture.

Legacy Transsexuals vs. Autogynephiles
Before the rise of the current theory of gender that has seized control of our institutions at the elite level, there were very few people who underwent medical procedures in order to resemble individuals of the opposite sex. We called these folks “transsexuals” or “female impersonators,” as the vast majority were male. The men and women who engaged in these practices were almost all same-sex-attracted people who desperately desired to be beautiful to opposite sex-attracted (i.e. straight) people of their sex.

These individuals did not desire, require or possess a legal regime to force others to behave as though their impersonation was working. Sometimes the impersonations and surgeries were so flawless people were, at least consciously, fooled. Sometimes the impersonations and surgeries were “good enough” for more sexually flexible but straight-identified people to be attracted to transsexuals. Sometimes the impersonations were failures but people went along with them out of pity and the desire to make the transsexual feel better.

The point was that if the room agreed with you about the gender you claimed, you possessed that gender, not the sex you were impersonating but you got people to act and speak as though you were that sex. That is what any plain understanding of “gender is a social construction” means.

And a minority of the community today called “transgender,” mainly older members thereof understand their gender in this context. These individuals tend to be vigilant about how others react to them, often becoming amateur cold readers so they can modulate their body language, tone of voice even claims about what they believe or have experienced emotionally so as to best impersonate someone of the sex they wish they were. They are mostly older and tend to be same-sex attracted. And one can see the logic of some of these individuals having been part of the long-term gay pride, gay rights movement.

But we face today is a very different situation with younger trans-identified people, along with opposite sex-attracted trans-identified males who have eschewed the red sports car and instead chosen to act out their midlife crisis by sexually traumatizing their wives and children, individuals we call autogynephiles. Until recently, it was viewed by the medical profession as wrong to transition children, young adults or autogynephiles. But thanks to masses of Big Pharma investment, the “do no harm” ethos has been broken down, as it was during the opioid crisis.

Trans-identifying autogynephiles, who, today, commit rapes at somewhere between 250% and 400% the rate that other males do, tend to have certain psychiatric comorbidities along with their sexual arousal at imagining themselves as a woman engaged in same-sex relations, such as preferential rape. And it is these individuals who dominate the leadership of pro-genderwang organizations and movements. It is from them that young, gender-confused people take their cues.

What autogynephiles desire is not to sincerely convince people they are women, through acts of credible impersonation but to force people to behave as though they believe they are, when they know they are not. When people interact with militant autogynephiles, they claim to believe these guys are women, not because they think they are but because they know they are violent, coercive men who will punish, harass, beat, rape or even murder them if they don’t pretend to be convinced. In other words, autogynephiles’ power to make people call them female comes from those people’s recognition that they are actually potentially physically dangerous men.

And many autogynephiles are as aroused by the force, the lack of consent, the lack of true belief as they are by the pronouns they compel and the silk panties they wear.

Subjectivity, Objectivity and Intersubjectivity
When I teach courses in both economics and philosophy, at the core of my teaching is the “three kinds of reality” model. Every person has three concurrent experiences of what is real. There is the subjective experience, which is how that person is internally, personally and individually seeing and experiencing the world. There is the objective experience, how the world actually is, as measured by instruments, senses and direct engagement with physical reality. But then there are intersubjective experiences, like our experience of railway time. Or like a bank loan, where $1000 today is worthy $1100 next year, where powerful social agreements and observations about others’ behaviour condition our reality.

Our community is fighting against people who believe gender is subjective, who simply want to force us to describe the world as they see it in their mind’s eye, irrespective of our actual perceptions or experiences. But our community contains two groups: those who see gender as intersubjective and those who see it as objective. Free speech, anti-authoritarian and refugees from the pre-genderwang trans scene, all constituencies I identify with, are intersubjectivists: our views are best expressed by my slight elaboration of Bill Maher’s words on the “bathroom debate:” “If you look [and act] like a man, go to the men’s; if you look [and act] like a woman, go to the women’s but you there, with the beard in the dress, you can fucking hold it.”

On the other hand, religious conservatives and feminists tend towards the objective side, which makes sense on a number of fronts. Feminists, especially survivors of men’s violence, are much less interested in splitting social hairs to describe tiny numbers of outliers within an already tiny demographic group than ensuring basic physical fairness and safety in women’s spaces and activities.

And I think they probably are in the right, here, in articulating a position that we need to stop focusing on people’s, usually men’s, thoughts about things and focus on material reality. But we also have to recognize that in debates about gender, courageous legacy transsexuals on our side punch massively above their weight. The establishment goes to great lengths to suppress their voices because when legacy transsexuals say “there is no such thing as a trans child” or “save women’s sports,” people who would not otherwise listen do.

On one hand, I think that we probably should speak for objective, material reality. On the other hand, the idea of gender as intersubjective reminds of a past détente with the trans community and points to ways of living together that are more harmonious. When this war ends, there will be a lot of people in bodies disfigured by “gender medicine” who will need better models, non-bullying, non-coercive models for interacting with the rest of society and we will need models for treating them with the kindness and respect their behaviour warrants.

Personally, I hope that people who have been bamboozled by genderwang build more resilience and become less concerned about how others talk about them, an enterprise that is probably the biggest, hardest and most incomplete work of my own life. And I also hope that this essay has provided a little more precise language and a little more perspective so we have, at least, a more constructive debate.

Authoritarianism Politics of Identity | fusangite | February 26, 2024

Colonized By Wankers: the Unique Vulnerability of the Anglosphere to Progressive Authoritarianism

In my last essay, I had some words to say about why Canada was uniquely susceptible to becoming one of the world’s pre-eminent Wokeistans. Because it was near the end of a 3500-word behemoth of an essay, rather than making you find it in the original text, I shall just begin by reposting it here:

In 1996, historians of Canadian religion, Nancy Christie and Mark Gavreau, building on the work of earlier scholars like Ramsay Cook, argued that Canada had taken a unique path to secularization, through the Social Gospel movement, of which Canadian statesmen Tommy Douglas, JS Woodsworth and William Lyon Mackenzie King had been prominent members.

Christie and Gavreau argued that Canada did not so much secularize as preside over a massive institutional migration of Protestant clergy from churches into the caring professions in the non-profit sector and civil service, that declines in church attendance were so sharp and so closely synchronized with the rise of proto-welfare state institutions between 1900 and 1940 that the clergy simply migrated from one set of institutions to another, bringing with them a largely intact set of beliefs about the moral order of society, just with the state, rather than God, at the top.

Consequently, I would argue, Canada has been uniquely vulnerable to religious enthusiasms that grip Protestant Christian communities because Protestant theology is embedded throughout our civil society organizations, the state and all the QuaNGOs in between. It makes sense, then, that our country is uniquely vulnerable to common Christian heresies and religious revitalization movements.

This is why, when those charged with our social welfare and hygiene see prominently displayed and fetishized mastectomy scars on teenage girls, they see imitation Christi; they see an Athlete of God. When social workers and public health nurses see track marks on the arms of career heroin addict, they see the stigmata of someone in privileged contact with the divine.

Of course, troubled, self-mutilating children should be seen as special authorities on human sexuality and gender; of course, habitual drugs addicts should be the guides of Canadian drug policy. Spiritual gifts, according to Saint Paul, are not evenly distributed. We live in a time when we need only look to the most sickly and exhibitionistic self-harmers to see who is most spiritually gifted. The real authority in the room is the person whose privileged knowledge is revealed by their stigmata.

Many found this section to be the most engaging part of the essay because it helped to account for what Canadians are experiencing as a unique vulnerability to the most bizarre forms of Woke social and political behaviour and the lack of any apparent cultural or institutional capacity to resist them. But I cannot let this story of Canada’s incomplete or superficial secularization stand as a sufficient, or even primary, explanation of the state of my country.

For one thing it does not account for the fact that Canada is not one nation sticking out within the Global North put part of a particular set of places that exhibit near-identical vulnerabilities to and comorbidities with the key themes and obsessions of Wokeness such as a celebration of censorship, placing certain groups of perceived villains (e.g. “TERFS, Zionist Jews, etc.) outside the social contract and state violence monopoly, essentialization and fetishization of race, combined with a theory of sex and sexuality primarily premised on some combination of the Emperor’s New Clothes and the Mister Potato-Head Fallacy.

If one thinks of Wokeness like Dante’s circles of Hell, Canada is not the only member of the outer circle. Out here with us are Ireland, Australia and New Zealand; the next most dramatically Woke places are Wales and Scotland and it is only then that places outside the Anglosphere enter the running, with Norway, Germany, Mexico and Brazil. Yet, although first target and most heavily invested-in in the progressive authoritarian project, the United States and England have, after many early capitulations are looked-to, the world over, as places where social movements, from feminists to Muslims to conservative Christians, are offering some of the strongest, most courageous grassroots pushbacks against Wokeness.

Clearly, there is some relationship between Wokeness and the Anglosphere but one that is complex and must be thoroughly understood because, understanding the variegated susceptibility of English-speakers to Wokeness, can reveal important things to us about progressive authoritarian identitarianism.

Now, to past! In Richard Bushman’s most underappreciated book, King and People in Provincial Massachusetts, the grand old man of American history reminds us that hijacking revolutions is not just a twentieth-century phenomenon. Indeed, it is in the nature of revolutions to inevitably be hijacked. That is because a revolution must assemble a substantial majority of the population to succeed; the vast majority of a population has to believe that rolling the dice on a revolution is more likely to improve their lot than not for one to happen.

The Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iranian revolution originally included socialists, students, feminists, liberals and all kinds of people it would eventually turn on. Similarly, Lenin’s, Mao’s, Toussaint L’Ouverture’s, Robespierre’s, Castro’s and most other successful revolutions entailed the assembly of a vast and variegated groups of constituencies with conflicting interests but who found the destruction of the regime to be a shared interest.

It should not surprise us, then, that the first modern revolution, Washington’s Revolution was just this sort of thing. Bushman exposes, in his study of war propaganda from the 1770s and 80s that people favouring the creation of an independent liberal republic in America were a small portion of revolutionaries who fought in the American Revolution but were over-represented in the military and political leadership largely thanks to George Washington’s personal sympathies with liberalism.

When the British Empire conducted a ruthless internal inquiry as to how they lost the Thirteen Colonies, not a thing every empire can do, and a significant cultural reason that British Empires have been global hegemons for the past 260 years, a quarter of a millennium, they engaged in a truth-seeking process more interested in imperial success than protecting decision-makers. Their conclusion: the reason they had lost America was that they had made the mistake of settling it with Englishmen.

The British Caribbean, full of Irish indentured servants and Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Québec, populated primarily with French Catholic colonists, had not joined the revolution because its master discourse was not a doctrine of republican liberal independence but the assertion of the Common Law right, granted all Englishmen, to rise up against and slay the king’s evil courtiers who have falsely counseled him into misgovernment.

In other words, most American revolutionaries were as bewildered as Iranians in 1980 and Russians in 1918. They had risen up, as loyal subjects of King George, to slay his evil counselors based on their rights as free Englishmen, propounded in every constitutional document from the Salic Law to Magna Carta.

So, the British Empire made an important decision: henceforth, no colony would be run by Englishmen; it would be run by a group the British had already colonized, a group already disentitled, and members of that group already comfortable in the role of stooge. That’s why Canadian British imperial pageantry is full of kilts, bagpipes and tartans… or at least it was until Justin Trudeau’s raceplay fetish got control of it and filled it with Vanishing Indians and settlers doing Aboface, with their drums and feathers.

So, the British Empire re-thought Ireland. The people to colonize Ireland were not the English but the Irish Scots, Scots who, for one reason or another, factual or not, believed that they were the true, pure Irish. Not a surprise in an era governed by the discourse of fictive etymology to re-describe the Irish colonial project not as Englishmen civilizing the Irish but as the Ulster Protestant Scotsmen returning to their homeland and reclaiming it.

Have you ever wondered why Indian accents sound so similar, whether the native speaker speaks an Indo-European/Aryan language from the North or a Dravidian/Tamil language from the South, like Malayalam? There is a reason for that: the thing that unites Indian accents from Kerala to Punjab is the “Welsh lilt.” Because the Welsh, like the Scots, people conquered by the English, were disproportionately sent to India.

In this way, every post-1787 white settler state in the Anglosphere (New Zealand, Canada, Australia) was colonized by an already-colonized people, as was Ireland, the original template for the project. The US, Scotland and Wales were merely, as so brilliantly expressed in Trainspotting, merely colonized by the English, who are wankers. But what happens when those colonized by wankers colonize others?

I would suggest that our deep colonial consciousness causes a constitutionally supine nature to enter a populace that has never even met its oppressor but instead only encounters, as authority figures, members of peoples also conquered by its oppressor. This also helps to explain the cases of Mexico and Brazil. Brazil, it must be remembered: produced the greatest black slave-hunters in the world, escaped and manumitted African slaves in Brazil who still had enough cultural knowledge to sail back to Africa and enslave African war captives in the Sertão around Luanda (the first place to legally define whiteness as—the possession of shoes).

This supine nature suffuses the cultures of the outer Anglosphere. It is no coincidence that the strong leaders of Canada’s twentieth century were overwhelmingly from outside Anglo culture, Laurier, St. Laurent, Trudeau, Mulroney and Chretien all grew in French-majority communities that threw off the culture of stoogery during the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, to declare that Quebecois were “masters in our own house.”

Anglo Canada, Australia and New Zealand, furthermore, are all places designed to toady to whoever the hegemon is. The position of stooge transcends one specific empire. Once the British Empire entered terminal decline, all three rapidly realigned their politics to serve the interests of the United States over the interests of Britain. And it is no coincidence that, since the Chinese Empire has regained its belligerent swagger under Xi Jinping, each of these countries has had a major Chinese political interference scandal, in which their national governments were beginning to hedge their bets, and, not knowing whether to kowtow to Washington or Beijing, began doing both.

Canada, Australia, Ireland and New Zealand are proceeding in lock step to return to their colonial past, transferring power from democratic institutions to technocrats within government or within the regulated oligopolies with which their governments are fusing. All three are increasingly in love with censorship, gun control and the transfer of parental rights to the state. Unlike Westminster, parliamentarians have discarded all pretense of representing their constituents to the government and now brazenly represent the government to their constituents, always voting with the party whip and belittling local voters who demand better as victims of “Russian disinformation” or bigots.

And it is not so much that these countries are becoming newly authoritarian. It is that their essential nature, carefully baked-in by the nineteenth-century British Empire is coming to fore. This is how they are designed to respond to stress, uncertainty and threat; they are returning to their roots, rediscovering their inner toady and petty enforcer. What was mistaken as cultural conservatism in these countries a hundred ago is being mistaken as a kind of illiberal cultural liberalism today. But the reality is that these things are both simply expressions of fundamental weakness, a desire to conform, a desperation for approval from whoever appears to hold the hammer, a nature intentionally built into these societies from their founding.

Progressive Canadians and New Zealanders, especially, are playing up their white guilt colonizer myths to histrionic proportions. There are many reasons for this, which I have been exploring on this blog for more than five years. But let us not discount what this myth is being used to obscure: that Canadians and New Zealanders were never the big, tough, warlike colonizers we have made our ancestors out to be. Part of the core of the myth of intentional genocide is a myth of our colonial ancestors possessing a strength and a ruthlessness they never did. We love to compare ourselves to Israel these days because part of us wishes our nation had been forged by truly great men, by powerful, ruthless, proud figures like David Ben Gurion and not a bunch of colonial administrators and mediocre lawyers at a genteel booze-up in Charlottetown.

To turn things around the people of the Outer Anglosphere must finally find their courage. At its core the crisis we face is not an information problem; it is not an ideological problem; it is not a public opinion problem; it goes much deeper. It is a problem of courage.

Authoritarianism Canadian Politics Politics of Identity | fusangite | December 23, 2023

Politics of Identity
Originally an article series, this category covers Stuart’s writing about identity and self-making in contemporary capitalism.